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his CEPS Task Force was launched to identify existing and new priorities of European 
energy market liberalisation by Rethinking the EU regulatory strategy for the internal 
energy market. While a number of priorities have been set by the Treaties of the 
European Union and subsequent legislation, this CEPS Task Force has reviewed the principal 
concerns of stakeholders in order to identify the appropriate tools to achieve them. 
Accordingly, rather than advocating alternative policy or regulatory choices for the EU, this 
report attempts to fine-tune the policy priorities and to develop the regulatory arsenal for the 
EU to succeed in achieving an integrated pan-European energy market. 
The Task Force met six times from January 2003 to October 2004. It involved representatives 
from the energy industries (e.g. energy supply, transmission, trading and retailing) and energy-
intensive companies, business associations, NGOs, academia as well as from the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and regulators. Discussions were based on presentations 
by Task Force members or invited guests and speakers whose names are listed in Annex 5. The 
common ground reached by the Task Force members is summarised in the Executive Summary 
at the beginning of this report.   
I want to thank the members of the Task Force for their active and positive contributions both 
throughout the meetings and during the editing of the final report. Although all members 
endorse the general content of the report, it should not be concluded that each member 
subscribes to every sentence of the text.  
 
Dag Klackenberg 
Chairman of the CEPS Task Force 





RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY 
FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his CEPS Task Force report identifies a number of priority actions that must be taken 
before the European Union can achieve an internal energy market and that also take into 
account other EU objectives, for example sustainable development and security of 
supply. These actions cannot be taken by a single actor but represent a shared responsibility 
spread across governments, their agencies from the EU or member states, as well as market 
participants such as energy companies or customers. The report examines the similarities and 
differences between the electricity and gas sectors and then identifies the essentials for a 
functioning electricity and gas market. The report provides a first list of priorities for action in 
areas that previously have not been at the centre of attention as well as a first indicative 
proposal for an institutional framework for electricity and gas market regulation. 
Key Messages 
1.  Considerable progress has been made in the creation of the internal electricity and gas 
market on the basis of EU and national legislation and regulation [2.2].
1 The initial focus 
has been on the prerequisites for liberalisation, such as competition in production, 
unbundling, network access and cross-border trade. Continuing efforts in all these areas 
and notably proper implementation of the requirements in the 2003 internal energy market 
directives remain crucial [2.3]. The next two years will be crucial in determining how the 
internal electricity and gas market will develop. Three major pieces of legislation – the 
two new electricity and gas directives and the cross-border electricity regulation – must be 
implemented by and applied from 1 July 2004, and the regulation on gas cross-border 
trade is expected to be adopted in the near future [4]. 
2.  Implementation of existing – including recent – pieces of legislation will be necessary to 
ensure a true internal market, but this will not be sufficient. In parallel, it is important to 
pay more attention to other, less prominent fields. This CEPS report singles out a number 
of areas for immediate attention to increase efficiency and confidence in electricity and 
gas markets.  
a.  Immediate priority should be given to: i) the introduction of incentive-based network 
regulation [4.2] and ii) the careful design of principal elements of the wholesale 
market, i.e. trade of electricity and gas for resale (‘wholesale market design and rules’) 
[4.3]. 
b.  Other areas include the consistent application of competition rules in combination with 
regulation [4.1], empowerment of consumers [4.4], the creation of regional electricity 
markets or gas hubs [4.5] and the development of an effective market monitoring and 
assessment mechanism, based on common criteria and definitions and undertaken by 
agreed rules between the EU, member states and regulatory authorities [4.6, 6.1, 6.2]. 
In addition, a functioning electricity and gas market depends on market-compatible 
solutions to security of supply and environmental issues [5.1, 5.2].  
                                                           
1 Numbers between brackets refer to the corresponding sections in the main text where the key messages 
and recommendations are discussed. 
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Main Findings (full summary) 
Consistent application of competition policy and regulation 
1.  There are inconsistencies of approaches to competition policy and regulation across the 
member states, especially regarding market power. These need to be resolved eventually, 
but in the absence of an agreed EU-wide approach to dealing with concentration, market 
power can be addressed by a number of available tools. These include effective 
implementation of existing and forthcoming legislation, improved terms of third-party 
access, including an effective cross-border regime. Another necessary element is a high 
degree of transparency of market information about transmission, distribution, demand and 
supply in both electricity and gas markets [4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5]. 
Network regulation 
2.  There is a need for non-discriminatory and easy access to the electricity or gas grid [3.2]. 
Proper implementation of the new EU electricity and gas legislation should provide this 
access, along with, in the case of gas, the proposed gas transmission regulation giving a 
legal basis to the principles agreed in the Madrid Forum [6.1]. In addition, incentive-based 
energy regulation is crucial to achieve efficiency gains and improved customer service 
notably for distribution, where the principal network assets are found. The objective must 
be to create incentives for the network operator to improve efficiency, deliver high quality 
of service and make additional appropriate investments. Regulation of the network 
business should be based on two primary principles: an appropriate rate of return must be 
earned on the regulated asset base and the costs passed through to network users must be 
efficiently incurred. Regulation must provide incentives for network companies to improve 
their efficiency. This is a task for the EU and the member states [4.2, 4.5]. 
Wholesale markets 
3.  Markets express scarcity through prices, which drive investment decisions (short- and 
long-term) by market participants. For electricity and gas, the price signal is composed of 
three diverse elements: the price of the commodity (i.e. electricity or gas), the transport 
price (i.e. the price for the use of available transport infrastructure) and finally, the price of 
system-specific requirements (e.g. storage, balancing, reserve or intra-day trading). 
Distortions in any one area not only undermine the efficiency of the whole market, but also 
erode market confidence, which is indispensable for maintaining the support of the public 
and market participants as well as for attracting new entrants. Among other things, market 
confidence requires that governments both watch for and redress anti-competitive practices 
and promote measures to improve market functioning, which underlines the importance of 
competition policy and regulation – in particular sufficient ex-ante regulation to create a 
competitive framework [3.1, 3.2, 4.3, 4.5].
  
4.  Power exchanges and gas hubs can increase efficiency and secure transparency in 
wholesale markets and thereby create market confidence [3, 4.5].  
4.1  Although 80-90% of all electricity contracts within the EU are bilateral, the 
remaining trades on the power exchanges can ensure price discovery, including spot 
and term markets (i.e. futures, forward). A reliable forward price (based on a 
transparent, trustworthy and liquid wholesale market) is a precondition to ensure 
adequate long-term investment, notably in generation. Gas hubs are similar in that 
they facilitate the development of efficient wholesale markets with similar price 
signals within a gas grid or at major interconnections [3.1, 4.3]. RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 3 
 
4.2  Power exchanges and gas hubs will provide a platform for financial instruments to 
participants to insure against systemic risks, such as liquidity or price risks [3, 3.1, 
4.3].  
4.3  Power exchanges can also apply market-based instruments to address congestion 
management [3, 3.1].  
An essential requirement for the functioning of any form of power and gas trading, such 
as power exchanges, gas hubs and bilateral trade, is that market participants have access to 
the fundamental requirements to participate in the market related to electricity and gas 
trade, including having access to the adjacent infrastructure. For electricity, this includes 
notably access to balancing, reserve, intra-day and day-ahead markets. In natural gas, 
these same requirements obtain in that market participants need access to long-, medium- 
and short-term gas supplies and transportation capacity, including within-day balancing, 
and flexibility services, notably access to gas storage. In addition in the case of gas, other 
critical elements are the maintenance of upstream gas production (i.e. keeping the overall 
level of production available to EU markets at a certain level) and tarification and 
balancing between regions. For both electricity and natural gas, forwards and futures 
markets are essential indicators of forthcoming demand and investment trends, which may 
also convey messages that cross national borders.  
Empowering consumers 
5.  There have been structural and technical barriers preventing small consumers from fully 
benefiting from liberal markets. These are gradually being removed. Other preconditions 
for complete retail competition are full unbundling, effective TPA and regulatory certainty 
and simplicity. Additional progress is likely to be achieved by easing supplier switching 
and providing better and more accessible information and education to consumers via for 
example consumer councils or advisory boards within regulatory authorities [4.4]. 
Regional markets 
6.  There is considerable merit in applying the pragmatic concept of ‘regional markets’ or ‘gas 
hubs’ as a transitional step towards a true internal market. Regional markets would be 
designed in terms of geographical proximity or harmonisation of the regulatory philosophy 
and practice as well as trading rules and would ultimately develop into ‘regional 
platforms’. To ensure minimum convergence of different regional markets, some kind of 
boundary conditions seem indispensable, such as general rules on congestion management 
or transmission pricing, on balancing and on the role of power exchanges or gas hubs. 
Such rules, for example, could be set by the European Commission and would in effect 
constitute a ‘Standard Market Design’ [4.5].  
Market monitoring and assessment 
7.  Market monitoring and assessment can be a powerful tool to increase transparency, market 
confidence and public support. It should therefore be asked whether national regulatory 
authorities should not be more involved in market monitoring and assessment, given their 
detailed knowledge of the national market. Although the monitoring and assessment 
mechanism should be applied to the electricity and gas markets as a whole, there are a 
number of priority areas. These include monitoring and assessing (i.e. definitions) of 
concentration and market power for relevant product and geographical markets. Another 
area could be potential infrastructure shortcomings, which eventually could lead to a 
‘European interconnector plan’. Finally, there is merit to including monitoring and 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
assessment in order to evaluate the competitive implications of merchant lines and LNG 
terminals and to determine whether TSOs comply with their obligations of developing the 
network [4.6].  
Security of supply and environmental protection 
8.  Security of supply and environmental protection, as central elements of EU energy policy, 
need to be addressed by government policy. Such policies increasingly apply market-based 
instruments to minimise distortions to competition and if possible to enhance the 
competitiveness and efficiency of the market [5, 5.1, 5.2]. However, market-based 
instruments will only work optimally once a robust and liquid wholesale market has been 
established – hence the importance of ensuring that the wholesale market works. 
Institutional Framework 
9.  The CEPS Task Force identified a need to take a fresh look at the institutional framework 
for energy regulation, including the competition law that is currently in place in the EU. 
This extends both to the institutional design (how do organisations work?) and to their 
respective tasks (who does what?) [6.1, 6.2]. As to institutional design, the report analyses 
several options to create a more coherent institutional framework [6.3]. The preliminary 
analysis concludes that as long as the EU continues to adhere to the Meroni doctrine, 
which prohibits EU executive agencies, many of the theoretical options are not feasible. It 
can be expected that the outcome of the debate on the European Constitution will set (new) 
boundaries for the institutional framework. As for the assignment of respective tasks, the 
preliminary analysis points to the need for a clearer and more transparent division of 
labour between the different organisations responsible for regulation in the EU and the 
member states.  
Recommendations  
Consistency of regulatory frameworks and practice 
1.  In order to bolster market confidence and implement the solution that best supports the 
development of competition in EU electricity and gas markets, policy-makers and 
regulators at EU and member state level should remove the inconsistencies between the 
regulatory frameworks and practices in member states [3.2, 6.1]. 
2.  There is an urgent need for a consistent approach across the EU with respect to the 
tolerable degree of market concentration so that network energy markets will not fail [6.1].  
2.1  The EU must ensure consistent approaches and definitions across the EU and 
member states for relevant product markets [3.2] and relevant geographical markets 
[4.5].  
Wholesale markets 
3.  Regulatory frameworks in member states must allow and ideally facilitate the proper 
functioning of wholesale markets. If the new electricity and gas directives do not have the 
desired effect (in the spirit and letter of the legislation), full unbundling of distribution, 
including divestiture, should be considered [4.2, 4.3].  
4.  There should be considerable stakeholder involvement in the design of the wholesale 
market. The EU, its member states, regulators, TSOs and other market participants should 
pay more attention to the proper functioning of power exchanges, gas hubs and OTC RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 5 
 
trading. This is indispensable for the functioning of the market and to harness the potential 
forces that such exchanges constitute [4.3].  
4.1  For electricity, wholesale market design includes notably balancing, term, spot, 
reserve, day-ahead and intra-day markets, which are far from being implemented in 
all member state markets [4.3]. 
4.2  For gas this includes access to long-, medium- and short-term gas supplies (including 
day-ahead traded markets), storage and transportation capacity, including within-day 
balancing, which are still missing in many markets [4.3].  
5.  Harmonisation of rules in the EU preventing market manipulation, such as insider trading, 
and requiring segregation of accounts and reporting on trades will be needed in the absence 
of national rules or EU laws, which only cover derivatives but not the commodities per se 
[4.3].  
5.1  But any new rules should reflect the level of risk and the care that needs to be given 
to ensure that these do not become an unfair barrier to entry and prevent liquid 
markets from developing [4.3]. 
Dialogue with external suppliers 
6.  The dialogue on the effects of the internal EU market and regulatory developments on the 
EU’s external suppliers should be strengthened and include representatives from those very 
same external suppliers. This offers opportunities for both the EU and its external suppliers 
but also poses the risk of collusion [5.1].  
6.1  EU policy-makers could consider involving representatives of external suppliers in 
relevant groupings such as the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), the 
Electricity Regulatory Forum of Florence and the Gas Regulatory Forum of Madrid 
[5.1]. 
Market monitoring and assessment 
7.  The EU (including the European Commission, the EU member states and regulators) 
should develop a market monitoring and assessment mechanism, based on common criteria 
and definitions and undertaken by agreed rules [4.2, 4.3].  
7.1  This should include agreed rules on the assignment of responsibilities, data 
collection, stakeholder involvement, benchmarking methodologies and publication of 
results [4.5, 4.6].  
7.2  The market monitoring and assessment mechanism should be kept as simple as 
possible avoiding unnecessary costs [4.5, 4.6]. 
8.  Although the monitoring and assessment mechanism should be applied to the electricity 
and gas markets as a whole, there is merit to immediately focus on: 
8.1  concentration and market power [4.1]; 
8.2  potential infrastructure shortcomings, including monitoring of capacity management 
mechanisms and demand-side measures to ensure optimal use is being made of the 
existing infrastructure
2 [4.5]; and 
                                                           
2 To counteract such systemic deficits, market-based approaches may act to reduce demand, e.g. via the 
ability of customers to sell back to the network or become market participants themselves. 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
8.3  an evaluation of the competitive implications of gas storage facilities, merchant lines, 
LNG terminals and whether TSOs are complying with their obligations to develop 
the network [4.5].  
9.  Market monitoring and assessment should lead to a ‘European interconnector plan’ [4.6].  
9.1  This plan should be supported by national regulators, the European Commission and 
ultimately the European Council to create political momentum in member states to 
overcome their reluctance to build new infrastructure. 
Empowering end-consumers 
10. Providing individual consumer choice is the best way to empower consumers. In order to 
be able to exercise their right to choose, end consumers must be empowered by being 
given access to information and education, via consumer councils, consumer advisory 
boards as well as simple procedures to switch suppliers and access to suitable metering 
equipment [4.4].  
11. Although consumer empowerment will be a task for member states, CEER might launch a 
benchmarking exercise of best practice [4.4].  
12. This exercise should also analyse whether harmonised standards in metering equipment 
could reduce costs of metering equipment across the EU. 
Network regulation 
13. There is a need to focus on an incentive-based regulatory framework for the monopoly 
network business, notably for distribution, where the principal network assets are located 
and by extension where major costs are incurred. The preconditions are that incentives lead 
to efficiency improvements, quality service delivery, costs continue to correspond to the 
benefits and the rate of return reflects the level of risk [4.2]. Incentives must ensure that 
networks are rewarded for both efficiency and quality of service (to both types of customer 
– end consumers and network users). Quality of service must be delivered at a reasonable 
cost and accompanied by efficiency improvements. 
14. Best-practice should be encouraged by, for example, CEER [4.4].  
15. Ideally, there should be EU legislation to avoid incompatible implementation across 
member states [4.2].  
16. Regulation must be stable and amendments must have a long-term character and be 
predictable to minimise regulatory risk. 
Regional markets 
17. There is considerable merit in applying the pragmatic concept of ‘regional markets’ as a 
transitional step towards a true EU internal market [4.5]. 
17.1  To ensure a minimum convergence of ‘regional markets’, there is a need to set some 
kind of boundary conditions such as general rules on congestion management and 
transmission pricing, balancing and the role of power exchanges [4.5, 4.6].  
17.2  The EU should develop ‘regional platforms’ for regional transmission planning 
processes, thereby allowing room for regional solutions while safeguarding the 
functioning of the EU market [4.5]. RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 7 
 
17.3  Such rules should be set by the European Commission as is currently done in the 
Draft Guidelines. In effect, this would constitute something similar to a Standard 
Market Design [4.5]. In line with the above, part of the conclusions of the 8th 
Florence Electricity Regulatory Forum cover the creation of Mini Fora on a regional 
basis.
3 
Market-compatible security of supply and environmental policies  
18. Further work is needed to develop market-compatible instruments to deal with security of 
supply and environmental challenges [5]. Areas that need particular attention are: 
18.1  Reserve capacity for power generation, network liability rules and the criteria the 
long-term development of the electricity, and natural gas networks dealing with 
potential risks of gas import dependency [5.1], as well as  
18.2  Design and implementation of environmental policies such as those aiming to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and support increased utilisation of renewables [5.2]. 
The institutional framework of EU energy market regulation 
19. There is a need to take a fresh look at the EU institutional framework for regulation 
including competition policy. Although coordination of national regulators appears to be 
the preferred option for member states and the European Commission, it is clearly second-
best, because coordination can add significant complexity and reduce effectiveness [6.1, 
6.2]. 
20. Therefore, the EU should re-evaluate the Meroni doctrine whose prohibition of EU 
executive agencies rules out more effective options to achieve a coherent EU institutional 
framework [6.3]. 
 
                                                           
3 These will be formal meetings, chaired by the European Commission, which bring two to three 
countries together with regulators, the ETSO and power exchanges to focus on congestion management. 
A main issue will be the development of a common method to allocate capacity among neighbours.  
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FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
CHAIRMAN: DAG KLACKENBERG 
RAPPORTEURS: CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER & KYRIAKOS GIALOGLOU 
1.  Rationale for a Task Force on the Internal Energy Market 
The EU internal market for electricity and gas is going through an extraordinary process of 
development and deepening. After a period of political hesitation at the EU level, the first-
generation internal market directives of 1996 and 1998
4 initiated a period of reform, 
liberalisation and re-regulation, introduced competition policy to the sector, triggered 
permanent debate on the merits of regulation and cooperation and brought about considerable 
restructuring as well as consolidation in the markets themselves. The second generation of EU 
regulation is now emerging in both electricity and gas,
5 and it is widely viewed as a major 
improvement over the first generation. Nevertheless, a smooth-functioning energy market in 
Europe – which is in everybody’s interest – will require more action from both public and 
private actors.  
This CEPS Task Force report sets out why further action is required and specifies which areas 
should receive priority. It dwells on the role played by public actors, both at member state and 
EU level, as well as that of the market players. The report’s analysis leads to a list of 
recommendations, which collectively form a concrete proposal for action (presented in the 
Executive Summary). 
As the Commission’s three benchmarking reports
6 have demonstrated, the internal market for 
electricity and gas is still highly incomplete. The aim of pursuing its completion is clear from 
the EC Treaty: the internal market is one means to achieve the socio-economic objectives 
specified in Art. 2 EC.
7 Amongst the more serious weaknesses highlighted in these reports, 
four warrant special mention: 
                                                           
4 Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, Directive 98/30/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 
5 Regulation on cross-border trade in electricity (EEC) No 1228/2003 and the new electricity 
(2003/54/EC) and gas (2003/55/EC) directives enter into force from 1st July 2004, and the proposed 
Regulation on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks, COM(2003) 741 is expected to be 
passed early 2005. 
6 First Benchmarking Report on the Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2001)1957, 03/12/2001; Second Benchmarking Report on the 
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2002)1038, 02/10/2002 – and updated version including the accession countries, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, SEC(2003)448, 07/04/2003; and Third Benchmarking Report on the Implementation of 
the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, Commission Draft Staff Working Paper, 01/03/2004. 
7 These include inter alia: 1) harmoniously balanced and sustainable development of economic activities; 
2) a high level of employment and social protection; 3) sustainable and non-inflationary growth; 4) a 
high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance; 5) a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment; and 6) economic and social cohesion and solidarity 
among member states. 10 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
•  conspicuously large price differentials which would not survive in a well-functioning and 
integrated internal market and insufficient response of prices to supply and demand 
conditions, including network capacity, mainly for electricity; 
•  shortcomings in infrastructure especially as regards cross-border interconnectors 
(including shortcomings in maximising the amount of existing capacity made available to 
users); 
•  actual and potential cross-border competition, which ought to be the hallmark of a working 
single market, has remained weak; and 
•  concentration in generation (electricity) and gas import, transit and supply is high, if not 
increasing – at least in some markets. 
It goes without saying that these four weaknesses need to be urgently addressed. The second 
package is a necessary but probably insufficient condition to achieve real progress. If more has 
to be done, it must be spelled out and acted upon.  
Moreover, one cannot speak of completing the ‘internal market’ without taking into account 
two crucial contextual policies: security of energy supply and the ‘policy nexus’ of energy and 
environmental concerns. The former has been brought to the forefront of the agenda by the 
recent multi-country black-outs as well as concerns about reserve capacity in electricity and 
long-run security of supply questions in natural gas. The latter relates to instruments for 
climate policy, such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants and 
support for renewable energies, in addition to energy efficiency and conservation. The 
appropriate roles of the EU and the member states and the organisation of market forces by 
market players within the framework of rules set by the two levels of government for the 
purpose of these two policies – including the use of market mechanisms to help deliver 
security of supply and environmental policies – are critical for the working of an (integrated) 
internal market. Accordingly this report attempts to incorporate strategic reflections in this 
respect and argues that there is considerable scope for market-based approaches to function in 
a publicly-designed context. 
The CEPS Task Force has taken a fresh look at possible strategies to achieve a genuine and 
effectively functioning internal market for electricity and gas. The priority actions identified 
involve a whole range of actors, including private entities such as energy companies, traders or 
consumers and public ones such as member state governments, EU bodies and agencies at both 
levels of government. 
This report is structured as follows: This introductory section is followed by a short assessment 
of the internal energy market today (section 2) and a description of market developments and 
regulation (section 3). Section 4 discusses EU priorities for the internal energy market, 
followed by section 5 on new policy instruments to achieve security of supply and 
environmental protection. Section 6 concludes with a first indicative proposal for an 
institutional framework for electricity and gas market regulation.  
The report is preceded by an Executive Summary including key messages, main findings and 
policy recommendations.  
The report also has several Appendices including a glossary of technical terms and 
abbreviations (Appendix 4) and a list of members of the Task Force and invited guest and 
speakers (Appendix 5).  RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 11 
 
2.  Assessing the internal energy market today 
The internal market for electricity and gas must combine basic features of any internal market 
with the peculiar characteristics of network markets, supplemented by the special properties of 
the two sectors (including similarities and differences). First we briefly inspect what it takes to 
combine these three aspects (section 2.1), followed by highlights of the first package of 
measures and shortcomings (in 2.2). Section 2.3 reviews the essentials of the second (or 
‘acceleration’) package, against the backdrop of the major outstanding weaknesses of the 
internal market in energy today.  
2.1  The ambition to build an internal energy market 
All marketable goods and services (other than ‘pure military’ items) are in principle traded, 
actually or potentially, in the internal market. As spelled out in section 1, the internal market 
serves the socio-economic objectives of Art. 2, EC. The Treaty correctly imposes both the 
establishment  and  the proper functioning of the internal market since only when both are 
ensured can one reasonably expect the objectives to be effectively achieved. Therefore, a 
suitable definition of the internal market combines both aspects, as follows: the EU internal 
market is based on the free movement of goods, services, capital and workers, as well as the 
free establishment across intra-EU borders, combined with the necessary regulation to deal 
with market failures at the EU level, and competition policy to make it function properly. Note 
that non-discrimination, as a core principle of EU law, is also relevant.  
There is no reason to expect this definition to be any different in the case of gas and electricity. 
Given the tradition of public utilities in all member states, however, it was long held that 
utilities – state-owned, monopolistic and enjoying exclusive rights in member states – were 
exempted from the internal market by virtue of Art. 86, EC (formerly Art. 90). Challenges to 
this interpretation were dismissed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Sacchi case 
(1974). It was only in 1990 and 1991 (in two telecoms cases) that the Court changed position. 
Essentially, the Court acknowledged the balance in Art. 86 (sub 1 and sub 2): it might be 
possible that, if free movement and free establishment were overriding, there would be no way 
in which the “services of general economic interest” (as Art. 86 calls such utilities) could fulfil 
their “particular tasks”. However, exclusive rights are such a serious breach of the basics of the 
Treaty (e.g. free movement and freedom of establishment) that, first, such rights must be based 
on a legitimate national objective (and mere protection does of course not qualify), and, 
second, the pursuit of this legitimate objective cannot be but ‘proportionate’ (only when it is 
demonstrated that there are no ways the ‘particular tasks’ can be fulfilled with means less 
hindering free movement or not at all can they be allowed). This reversal by the ECJ went to 
the heart of the liberalisation debate in network markets: Are not utilities, in this case 
electricity and gas, more exposed to competition within and across intra-EU borders, under the 
legal constraint of universal or public service obligations? Progress in economics as well as a 
range of practical experiments showed that there was considerable scope for such approaches, 
even though the design of such liberalised network markets and their supervision proved 
anything but easy. These analyses and experiments strengthened the case for arguing that 
giving up the internal market in network industries was a disproportionate sacrifice, not 
essential – perhaps even counterproductive – for the ‘particular tasks’ at hand. The major 
question became how to ensure the accomplishments of the universal or public service 
obligations while allowing EU-wide free movement, establishment and competition.  
Here the third element enters the picture. The characteristics of gas and electricity networks are 
such that competition is not suitable for transmission and distribution, as they are natural 
monopolies. Thus, the question was how to permit these (costly) parts of the networks to 12 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
remain monopolistic and yet to 1) act as cost-minimisers and 2) serve the internal market flows 
by open access for all relevant market players from all EU countries. Since an ad-hoc structure 
of cross-border interconnectors had been built as the basis of cooperation between incumbent 
monopolies, these interconnectors logically had to be considered as part of the transmission 
system in an integrated internal market. The subsequent issue turned out to be how to 
transform this ad-hoc cooperative investment from the past into an adequate set of 
infrastructure for the EU as a whole, as a prerequisite for unhindered actual or potential flows.  
In other words, a competitive internal market in electricity or gas was about power generation 
and gas production or import and final supply to end-consumers. By necessity, this required 
access to and use of the grids in between the point of production/import and final supply, 
whether national or EU-wide.  
Box 1. Six considerations about electricity and gas markets liberalisation in the EU 
Network industry liberalisation in the EU must take into consideration the following six points when 
referring to electricity and gas (although it should be noted that gas is not a universal service). 
First, in these energy sectors, there is scope for competition in the market sections of generation and 
final supply (including metering and billing). The natural monopoly grids should not be subjected to 
infrastructure competition; one might opt for competition for the franchise (to run the grids for a 
period) but what matters is the regulation which ensures seamless interconnection, grid services, 
sufficient capacity (hence, investment strategies) and access at proper prices, given cost minimisation. 
Getting all of this right is a tall order.  
Second, unbundling the incumbent (from the old days of integrated utilities) is indispensable for 
competition (entry, to begin with) to get started, to enable proper cost calculation of the different 
business activities (e.g. pure generation) and to pre-empt cross-subsidisation as long as incumbents 
retain their generation and retail business. Unbundling must be complemented by the creation of a 
regulator to supervise and enforce it, for the purpose of fostering undistorted competition. The 
regulator (like competition authorities) has to be fully independent from formerly integrated 
businesses as well as from the government.  
Third, what used to be the ‘particular tasks’, namely universal and/or public service obligations 
(USOs and PSOs), have to be spelled out with precision. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, multiple-
actor competition requires certainty about the roles and responsibilities of different market 
participants in delivering them. Secondly, the regulator needs verifiable criteria to measure the fact 
that USOs and PSOs are being delivered. In this way, free movement and competition are fully 
compatible with public service ambitions. 
Fourth, USOs/PSOs may be generally applicable or assigned to one firm (e.g. the incumbent), 
perhaps for a special region of target groups. If assigned, transparent and non-distortive rules for 
financing the USO/PSO ‘burden’ ought to be agreed.  
Fifth, access and interconnection needs to be regulated either as a right or as a guarantee, following 
negotiations, within a reasonable period. Even more importantly, access pricing and pricing of cross-
border interconnectors as well as a transparent, least-cost congestion regime have to be properly 
designed, which is a difficult yet crucial task. 
Sixth, cross-border hindrances of any kind have to be removed in the EU since, as the ECJ has often 
pronounced, cross-border trade in the internal market should not, in principle, differ from ‘domestic’ 
trade.  
 
Some annotations can be added to the points outlined in Box 1, of course. As to the absence of 
infrastructure competition, there are some minor exceptions. It may be economical for a 
generator to build its own transmission line due to specific conditions. In natural gas, the scope RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 13 
 
for so-called ‘merchant lines’ also exists.
8 It should also be noted that upstream gas pipelines 
transporting ‘raw’ gas have to be distinguished from downstream pipelines transporting 
processed gas (but, at times, with different odorants or indeed no odorant, depending on the 
member state; this technical barrier requires harmonisation, which in turn calls for equivalent 
safety perceptions).  
Like in other network markets, the access regime is vital for the proper functioning of and 
indeed the very emergence of sufficient competition in the internal market. As always in 
natural monopoly, one needs incentive-based pricing, but this is a complex process in actual 
practice. Can one permit the member states to come up with de facto different systems, even if 
the general principles are the same? Moreover, how can one find out whether cost 
minimisation is achieved, if cost rules differ between member states so that benchmarking 
might give false signals? In energy markets the term ‘cost reflective pricing’ has been coined 
with the further qualification that ‘costs should be efficiently incurred’. In other network 
markets general terms also include ‘cost based’ and ‘cost oriented’ (e.g. telecoms). In any 
event, if access prices are ‘too high’ they tend to be anti-competitive, discouraging entry; if 
‘too low’ they might encourage inefficient entry
9 and discourage transmission and distribution 
systems to invest in maintenance and capacity investments (as there would be no adequate 
return on investment).  
It ought to be noted that parts of the natural gas business are a high risk venture. The reasons 
include the long-run nature of very large investments for obtaining the primary resource 
(unlike electricity which can be made from a range of inputs), the geographically restricted 
nature of markets served by gas pipelines and, not least, what is called in economics ‘asset 
specificity’ which might lead to opportunistic behaviour such as the ‘hold-up’ problem. 
Nevertheless, some parts are relatively low risk, notably local distribution networks and 
standard transmission. 
Box 2. Asset specificity  
Asset specificity means that one or both parties to the transaction make specific investments (e.g. a 
pipeline or a well) that would not have alternative uses (or a markedly lower value in alternative uses: 
a pipeline between Algeria and Spain has no alternative but to serve the Spanish market, and possibly 
neighbouring markets). In other words, one party to the transaction (the supply company) makes an 
investment that is specific to the transaction (gas supply to Spain), which is effectively lost if the 
transaction does not take place as planned. The party that does not make an initial investment can 
threaten not to continue the transaction after the other party’s investment is made and issue demands 
for some change in the conditions that are favourable to its interests. The party that has already 
invested is therefore ‘held up’: it has to accept the new conditions because it does not want to lose its 
investment. Thus one party to the transaction can ‘extract rent’ from the other, by threatening to 
terminate the relationship after the investment is made unless new, more profitable conditions are 
accepted. Asset specificity has become the main reason for entering into long-term take or pay 
contracts.  
Source: Egenhofer and Labory (1998). 
                                                           
8 Merchant lines are privately financed interconnectors between member states or long-haul gas 
infrastructure that imports gas into the EU, which generally are seen as crucial for meeting the EU’s 
expected import requirements. 
9 Inefficient entry refers to entrants with relatively high costs which nonetheless enter because of 
distortions permitting them to make profits. Such competition does not necessarily promote cost 
minimisation nor lead to the exit of the least competitive firms, both of which are welfare-improving 
features of well-functioning markets. 14 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
2.2  The first internal market package in energy 
The liberalisation of EU electricity and gas markets was designed as a gradual process. The 
framework set by the electricity and gas directives of 1996 and 1998
10 fixed a minimum level 
of competition at member state level by way of common rules while progressively bringing 
down barriers to cross-border trade. It was expected that market dynamics would unleash 
competitive forces, which would quickly remove the last remaining barriers to the functioning 
of a fully competitive and integrated European market.  
The 1996 electricity directive concentrated on full liberalisation of generation and introduced a 
six-year phased-in freedom for all large and medium-sized companies to choose their supplier 
as well as the freedom to construct lines. Access to the grid was tackled by unbundling the 
accounts of integrated companies and by promulgating a number of different access rules to be 
implemented by member states that should guarantee non-discriminatory access. The 1998 gas 
directive chose the same approach in principle, but with two modifications: first, the transition 
period was to be ten years to accommodate long-term investment needs, and second, the 
unbundling provisions were lighter to avoid undermining EU companies’ bargaining powers 
with non-EU suppliers. The gas directive allowed each power generator to choose its own 
supplier.  
While it is true that considerable progress has been achieved in electricity and natural gas, 
there are still weaknesses.
11 For example, there is a lack of effective unrestricted and non-
discriminatory third-party access to networks due to vertical integration and a weak regulatory 
function, high and increasing concentration (and market power), limited or non-existent 
competition in the small consumer segment and generally, in sufficient liquidity in wholesale 
markets and response of prices to supply and demand conditions, including network capacity, 
mainly for electricity.  
Many of the issues in the electricity markets can also be found in the gas markets. There are 
problems with access and high access charges and the independence of transmission systems 
operators (TSOs). There are concerns about a lack of transparency over the publication of 
infrastructure capacity able to dispatch both cross-border and domestic transits, and also in 
relation to capacity reservation procedures. Rules that govern network balancing are sometimes 
seen as being too stringent, to the point that they hinder the development of market 
competition, while at the same time they do not reflect the costs incurred. More generally, gas 
import levels and cross-border trade are seen as not satisfactory, with the existing incumbents 
dominating domestic markets and wholesale prices. Gas trading hubs are slow to develop. 
2.3  The Acceleration package 
To address these issues, the EU has taken by a number of initiatives aiming at further structural 
reform, which has been identified by the European Commission as critical for all consumers to 
benefit from the opening of national markets to competition and for market integration.
12 EC 
initiatives include the so-called ‘Acceleration package’ consisting of the new electricity and 
                                                           
10 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC, respectively. 
11 Both achievements and shortcomings have for example been documented in all three of the 
benchmarking reports on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (European 
Commission, 2001a, 2002 and 2004a) and in the EC Strategy paper Medium-Term Vision for the 
Internal Electricity Market (European Commission, 2004b) 
12 See second benchmarking report (European Commission, 2002). RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 15 
 
gas directives
13 and one regulation on cross-border trade electricity.
14 This is currently 
complemented by a proposal for a regulation on access conditions to the gas networks, an 
infrastructure package, a proposal to improve security of supply and a proposal for a Directive 
on end-use efficiency and energy services.
15  
The Acceleration package fully opens markets to competition for non-household customers as 
of July 2004 and for all customers by July 2007. In addition, the package requires the legal 
unbundling of network activities from generation and supply, establishes regulatory authorities 
in all member states, mandates regulated third-party access (TPA) and published network 
tariffs, reinforces public service obligations especially for vulnerable customers and introduces 
monitoring of security of supply. For electricity it also sets up mandatory electricity labelling 
for fuel mix and for selected emissions data. The regulation on cross-border electricity trade 
provides for common tariff structures (including tariffs for cross-border trade), rules for 
congestion management and the requirement to provide information on interconnection 
capacities. The proposed regulation on access conditions to the gas networks attempts in a 
similar way to remove barriers to natural gas trade. It addresses partial or non-compliance with 
agreed guidelines for a transparent and cost-reflective system for cross-border trade. The basic 
philosophy is to ensure that the “Guidelines for Good TPA Practice” as agreed at the 
September 2003 Madrid Forum will be implemented across the EU in a consistent way and 
adhered to. In strengthening EU instruments to assist new infrastructure investment in 
electricity and gas, notably EU monitoring, the infrastructure package attempts to address the 
shortcomings of cross-border infrastructure.  
The previously cited past and upcoming legislation should be understood as pre-requisites for 
liberal EU electricity and gas markets to function. The Acceleration package corrected some of 
the shortcomings of the initial electricity and gas directives, which were the result of the 
political compromise that was necessary in the light of what were then difficult negotiations in 
both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The question, however, is whether 
the Acceleration package in combination with other relevant legislation (proposed and 
adopted) will be sufficient to complete the internal energy market and ensure its proper 
functioning. This report argues that it is not. There are a number of additional actions that can 
and should be taken to accelerate the completion of the internal energy market. Before we 
identify this set of additional priority actions in sections 4 and 5, we shall first have to discuss 
in the next section how EU electricity and gas markets work. 
                                                           
13 i) The initial 1996 Directive concerning common rules of the internal market in electricity (96/92/EC) 
as recently amended by 2003/54/EC; ii) The initial gas Directive of 1998 (98/30/EC) as recently 
amended by Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common 
Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing Directive 98/30/EC.    
14 Regulation (EEC) No 1228/2003 on Conditions for Access to the Network for Cross-Border 
Exchanges in Electricity.    
15 Proposal for a Directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services COM(2003) 739; Proposal 
for a directive concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure 
investment COM(2003) 740; proposed Regulation on conditions for access to the gas transmission 
networks, COM(2003) 741. Proposal for amendment of decision No. 1229/2003/EC on guidelines for 
Trans-European energy networks COM(2003) 742; Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, Energy Infrastructure and Security of Supply, COM(2003) 743 
final, {COM(2003) 739, 740, 741, 742, 743}. 16 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
3.  How the EU electricity and gas markets work  
Historically, markets develop naturally and on an ad hoc basis, with no initial universal 
standards. In the early trade of grain, for example, markets evolved locally and were 
characterised by local prices and informed by subjective analysis. As a result, these markets 
were highly volatile and it was impossible to manage risk or make secure investments. The 
development of transport led to bigger markets, which (since market participants no longer had 
to meet face to face) increasingly required objective standardisation to build up trust and 
liquidity. This was facilitated by the development of non-traditional market participants, such 
as speculators, who added sophistication to the market and, consequently, both confidence and 
expectations.  
There are a number of preconditions for efficiently functioning markets, including: 
1.  Liquidity. Efficient markets require liquidity to be achieved by easy market access, full 
cross-border (i.e. EU-wide) trade and a broad range of market participants with no single 
market participant being able to control the market price.  
2.  Transparency. Markets depend on transparent information, including reliable price signals, 
to allow market participants to make informed decisions whether to buy or sell.  
3.  Confidence and stability. Market participants require stability and dislike frequent rule 
changes.  
4.  Standardised operations. In order to speed up operations and lower transaction costs, 
markets need standardised methods of operation, i.e. clear market rules. Market rules 
usually come in the form of a standard contract and standard clearing and settlement 
procedures. 
5.  Inter-operability  is important in all markets but it assumes a special importance for 
network energy because of the network’s essential role in energy trade. 
Rules to ensure market functioning are commonly part of the general economic and legal 
framework of market economies, including for example guarantee of private property, contract 
law, competition law or consumer protection. Other rules such as clearing and settlement or inter-
operability might be organised as self-regulation by market participants. See discussion in the 
previous section. 
In electricity and gas markets, transactions among producers or importers, end-users, possible 
market intermediaries such as retailers, power exchanges or gas hubs, and brokers take place 
freely, within the ‘physical’ constraint imposed by the network. Nevertheless, market participants 
rely on access to the network to take part in the market. Hence, the need for unbundling and 
regulation to ensure effective and non-discriminatory third-party access to ‘essential’ transmission 
and distribution lines (see previous section).  
3.1  The electricity and gas market value chain 
The service of electricity and gas delivered to the customers is made up of different components: 
the production/importation of the commodity (electricity and gas), transportation through the grid 
(transmission, distribution, systems operation), related services (e.g. balancing, storage) that 
enable efficient trade and finally, end-use supply to small and big customers.
16 Some of these 
components have specific features that have a major bearing on the market. 
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A number of the functions such as production, related services or end-use supply can be organised 
competitively, while others cannot and therefore remain a natural monopoly. Due to technical 
constraints, systems operation remains a natural monopoly. Notably distribution, in most cases, is 
also a natural monopoly. There is no real competition in transmission (or transit which is now 
classed as transmission). The existence of two pipelines covering a similar route does not mean 
that there is any competition. A duopoly is the most likely situation. As for natural gas, storage 
may also be a natural monopoly in parts of the EU gas grid, where the majority of storage facilities 
are controlled by one or two companies. 
Both the transmission and the distribution networks are characterised by network externalities. 
They describe the fact that all interconnected parties for transmission and distribution alike benefit 
from investment in network improvement. This may discourage investment and in turn calls for 
regulation. In addition, networks are characterised by high sunk costs, which make them sensitive 
to uncertainty.  
Finally, there are coordination economies at systems level for power generation. They relate to the 
need for a diversified portfolio of electricity generation technologies to provide the different loads 
of electricity at the least cost. They may but do not necessarily appear at the level of a generation 
company. There are no scale economies at plant level, which could, for example, be brought 
forward to justify a high degree of concentration in the electricity or gas sector. 
Based on this short introduction to the main features of the electricity and gas sectors, we identify 
the critical areas in the value chain to ensure the functioning of the market. We will focus on 
producers, network operators, wholesale traders, suppliers and end consumers, both large and 
small (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Producers 
The role of producers in the market is to produce power or natural gas in a competitive way to 
ensure customer choice both in the short and long term. Because natural gas production depends 
on both specific sources – often in remote areas outside the EU- and long-term investment, there is 
a stronger emphasis on the long-term than in electricity. In order that producers can fulfil their 
role, three areas are critical. The first is non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid. The 
second is a proper long-term investment signal. The better the market works, the more robust 
should be price signals, especially from the wholesale market. There is an overarching goal to 
ensure a high degree of transparency regarding price formation. Long-term prices need to be 
reliable, especially if they serve the purpose of providing an investment signal. The third critical 
area is market power of generators or actual (or perceived) collusion of gas producers. Companies 
can be expected to be less willing to invest in production if it is characterised by market power. 
The availability of the transportation network is critical for the working of the market for natural 
gas, given the long-term nature of infrastructure investment and ‘asset specificity’. In specific 
circumstances, however, exemptions from competition rules can be beneficial for upstream 
investment for source development. 
Network operators  
Transmission is a natural monopoly. This is why the second gas directive requires regulated 
TPA with ex ante published tariffs. Network operators are possibly the most critical 
participants in the market. It is only non-discriminatory, cost-reflective and simple access to 
the network that enables the other market participants to freely trade in the market. A necessary 
precondition and a first essential area for this is independence from generators or supply 
companies in the power market or from producers, importers or supply companies in the gas 
market, respectively (unbundling). The second vital field is effective non-discriminatory third-18 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
party access, based on published tariffs for natural monopoly areas, i.e. transmission and 
distribution (and LNG facilities) and depending on the level of competition also for storage for 
natural gas. The third and final critical sphere is incentive-based network regulation, which 
needs to pursue a number of complementary objectives, which can be the result of the natural 
monopoly characteristic – in as far as given – of network externalities or high sunk costs. They 
include i) allowing for sunk cost recovery (financial sufficiency), ii) incentives for long-term 
investment (long-term efficiency), iii) incentives for efficient operation, notably efficient 
allocation of scarce network capacity (short-term efficiency),
17 iv) non-discrimination, v) 
simplicity and transparency and vi) quality of service. While the latter three objectives are 
critical for the current functioning of the market, the former two are essential to improve the 
overall market efficiency, since the transmission and distribution networks, where the major 
assets are located, are responsible for 30-50% of total costs. Network business should be 
regulated on the basis of two primary principles: 
•  the regulated asset base must yield an appropriate rate of return and 
•  where costs are passed through to network users, these costs must be efficiently incurred. 
Regulation must provide incentives for the network companies to improve their efficiency.  
Wholesale markets 
Wholesale markets (i.e. trade of electricity and gas for resale to final customers via bilateral 
contracts or power exchanges or gas hubs) consist of two parts: over-the-counter trade of 
bilateral contracts and exchanges. (In gas, hubs provide suitable locations for trade via both 
bilateral contracts and/or exchanges.
18) Wholesale markets are at the centre of efficient short- and 
long-term resource allocation in electricity and gas markets. Hence, the wholesale market’s role is 
to i) guarantee optimal dispatch from an economic perspective (in cooperation with network 
operators’ technical role), ii) provide investment signals to other participants, iii) offer risk 
management tools for systemic risks to market participants and iv) ensure clearing and settlement.  
Although formal exchanges can often only trade a small fraction, they play a crucial role in the 
operations of the wholesale market as they fulfil three essential functions. The first is price 
discovery. Spot and term such as futures prices (where they exist, i.e. Nordic countries and 
Germany) from the power exchanges are crucial information for market participants including 
balancing, reserve, day ahead and intra-day markets. The second is organisation of trading in a 
transparent way. Exchanges create market confidence and provide a mix between free market 
benefits and security requirements. The third function is to prevent systemic risk. This 
typically includes netting, risk monitoring (margining of positions), default management, etc. 
There are two types of risks inherent in energy trade. The first relates to market risks such as the 
high price volatility that is typical for power, which cannot be stored, or, for gas and electricity, 
short-term supply demand imbalances – e.g. in response to severe weather and/or infrastructure 
failure. The second includes the transaction risks associated with clearance and settlement 
procedures, e.g. risks connected to credit, market, intermediation (e.g. broker default), delivery, 
liquidity and settlement, operation, legal issues (e.g. contract law) and manipulation.
19 
                                                           
17 This includes notably congestion management and efficient dispatching. 
18 A gas hub is not an exchange. It is a convenient location for trade, which effectively creates a 
homogeneous product for trade, with some additional services to make that trade more secure. It does 
however make an appropriate location for a futures contract on an exchange, e.g. the IPE gas contract is 
based on gas delivered at the UK NBP. 
19 These are comparable to the parameters developed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to 
measure financial stability. | 19 
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Box 3. Differences and similarities between gas and electricity  
Although it is generally acknowledged that there are many similarities between electricity and gas, it is 
important to point out a number of key differences between the two sectors. Electricity is a secondary 
energy, using other primary energy sources (coal, natural gas, renewables, etc.) as an input to its 
generation. Natural gas is positioned as the source most likely to seize the biggest part of the 
generation market in the medium term due to technological advancement, a better environmental 
performance than other fossil fuels (with regard to CO2 emissions) and physical abundance. A second 
difference is that electricity cannot be stored as can natural gas and hence needs to be produced when 
consumed. This raises some issues of a technical nature of how to maintain balance on grid. The third 
difference worth pointing out is that there are no universal service obligations for natural gas. This means, 
contrary to electricity, there is no obligation for suppliers to ensure that each customer has access to 
natural gas at a reasonable price. There are however public service obligations on reliability and quality 
once a customer has signed up. Fourth, gas is a non-renewable energy, found in fixed locations in 
geological deposits around the world. Gas imports will come from increasingly remote locations, 
raising transportation costs to a significant extent, which in return increases the costs and changes the 
relative competitive position of natural gas vis-à-vis other fuels. Fifth, the EU as a whole and many 
EU countries – although to very different degree – are, or will become in the relatively near future, 
importers of gas from a few, large producers. This raises issues of import dependency, the risk of 
collusion and how to deal with it. In contrast, electricity can be produced in any country, and from 
various inputs, making it more flexible and less of a concern for both supply security and dependence 
on other countries for supply. It can be produced close to its end use, without huge transport or 
storage costs. In the EU, most member states are self-sufficient in electricity. A sixth difference is that 
in the gas sector congestion ‘bottlenecks’ are at present not as pronounced as in the electricity market. 
Nevertheless, this might be changing mainly due to increasing demand, significant long-term capacity 
reservations by incumbents of existing capacity and the fact that local congestion is developing at 
certain cross-border entry points in Europe. Seventh, contrary to electricity, there is investment in 
natural gas infrastructure due to the sector’s growth. Still, the density of the transmission systems is 
lower than in electricity. Also, infrastructure use is somewhat different in that some of it is used to 
bring natural gas into different member states and some of the infrastructure is used for transit. 
Finally eighth, there is an issue of different gas qualities, which at times can influence gas trade.  
End-use suppliers 
End-use suppliers sell energy to the customers and invoice accordingly.
20 This includes the 
provision of energy (physical component) and arranging its transport and other services such as 
metering and billing of consumption (service component). Suppliers perform two tasks. The 
principle task is to act as brokers that buy and sell energy, thereby assuming the risk of volatility 
and adjusting prices to consumption patterns and arranging for its transportation to the point of 
sale. In addition, they may provide added-value services to customers, such as selling 
differentiated energy (e.g. green power, interruptible supplies) or bundling with other utility 
services (e.g. telecoms, water, etc.).  
Traditionally, end-use supply was bundled with distribution, but in practice the two tasks can be 
performed separately. The service end of supply in principle can be provided competitively. The 
provision and operation of the infrastructure providing physical delivery are most likely to remain 
a natural monopoly.  
Critical areas are identical with those from other parts of the market, e.g. effective unbundling, 
non-discriminatory third-party access, regulated infrastructure access prices, wholesale market 
structure, transparency, market power and generally, distortions in other segments of the market. 
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Customers/end-consumers 
End-consumers (big and small) want to enjoy a non-distorted choice of energy commodities and 
associated services and, in doing so, to be able to choose from among different providers. 
Different customer groups and – within these groups, different customers – will require very 
dissimilar services in terms of the level of reliability and price, i.e. willingness to pay. Some 
industrial customers may choose a less reliable service such as interruptible supplies to reduce 
costs or produce or import their own power or gas, while other customers may be willing to pay 
for failure-proof supplies.  
Choice depends on the existence of wholesale and supply competition. There are several critical 
areas. First, distortions in other parts of the market are likely to have a detrimental effect on 
customers’ freedom of choice. These include unbundling, rules and prices for access to the grid or, 
customer-switching procedures. Also lack of availability of capacity or natural gas/power or 
sustained high prices for new entrants will prevent them from making competitive offers to 
consumers. Second, choice will be undermined by a lack of information on alternative supply 
offers or by discounting customers’ right to choose (a supplier) and any complexity in switching 
suppliers. End-consumers not only depend on competitive markets but also on a framework that 
ensures long-term availability of energy. 
3.2  Essential elements for electricity and gas markets 
From the above descriptions, we can derive essential elements for the efficient functioning of 
electricity and gas markets (see Figure 3). The first is effective competition policy in combination 
with ex-ante and ex-post regulation. Competition policy combats anti-competitive firm behaviour 
via general antitrust rules restricting competition or abuses of dominant positions or mergers, state 
aid rules and finally deals with rules for undertakings entrusted with public service obligations. 
Priorities in the past have been to enhance supply competition via antitrust, state aid and merger 
control; to support real customer choice mainly through antitrust and merger control; and to ensure 
non-discriminatory network access by antitrust rules. However competition policy relies primarily 
on ex-post action and is not an effective way of creating a pro-competitive regulatory framework. 
The time and risks involved waiting for competition policy to take effect often act as a barrier for 
new market entrants. Competition policy is complemented by (sectoral) regulation, mainly to 
ensure access to the network. In addition, network access is dealt with structurally by specific 
legislation (i.e. unbundling provisions) backed up with regulation (i.e. specific rules to ensure non-
discriminatory access). The latter is typically applied at member state level by national energy 
regulators on an ex-ante basis with ex-post revisions. Anti-trust rules remain complementary 
although they are important as some recent cases have shown (see Arana Antelo, 2003).  
The second essential element is the functioning of wholesale markets. Wholesale markets for 
electricity and gas are most critical for both transparency and efficiency. Wholesale markets 
provide the necessary market signals on price, capacities, flows, etc. in a transparent and non-
discriminatory manner to market participants. At the same time, they increase the efficiency of 
trading and associated functions such as balancing settlement and clearing and thereby reduce 
transaction costs. To date, wholesale market design has been largely left to general legislation 
overseeing all trading activities and which principally deals with financial transactions. Physical 
trading can take off even when no legislation is in place. A regulated model imposed from above – 
especially if implemented without extensive involvement of ‘non-market’ stakeholders such as 
TSOs – could be counterproductive in that it might create barriers to entry and reduce liquidity.  | 23 
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Markets need confidence by all market participants ranging from producers to customers (small 
and big) and including the whole value chain. This includes on the one hand confidence in the 
functioning of the markets (e.g. transparency and absence of distortions) and on the other, 
regulatory certainty (e.g. the absence of frequent rule changes). Market confidence is needed for 
economic reasons (e.g. to attract new entrants and investment) as well as to maintain public 
support for the internal electricity and gas markets, which initially was a controversial endeavour 
at least in some member states. But the market is not an aim in itself. Ultimately confidence in the 
market will only prevail if the market can prove that it is able to achieve the political objectives to 
provide energy at affordable or reasonable prices while protecting the environment in line with 
citizens’ expectations. Recent incidents of power outages may undermine public support as much 
as inefficient markets, even when such outages were technical network failures bearing no relation 
to the commercial market. This makes security of supply (both short and long-term) and the 
environment, each of which is an objective in its own right, intimately linked to the issue of 
market confidence. Market confidence can be improved by increased transparency, via for 
example benchmarking, easy customer switching, availability of information including hard 
physical data, to level the playing field for market participants.  
The following two sections analyse the policies and tools to support these essential 
requirements for electricity and gas markets. Section 4 identifies the following policy 
priorities: competition policy in combination with regulation, network wholesale market 
design, empowering of consumers, implications of regional markets and gas hubs and market 
monitoring and assessment. In section 5, we focus on market-compatible security of supply 
and environmental policies 
4.  Immediate EU policy priorities for the internal energy market  
In the previous section we identified the essentials for the electricity and gas markets (see 
Figure 3): competition and energy regulation, the functioning of wholesale markets and market 
confidence. In this section, we will discuss possible actions to improve the functioning of the 
internal electricity and gas market and analyse their potential implications. We will tentatively 
undertake a ‘subsidiarity test’ by sketching out whether the market, the member states or the 
EU are best placed to ensure that policy objectives are reached. For an overview, see Figure 4. 
4.1  Addressing concentration and market power 
In some countries, partial electricity and gas market liberalisation has led to market 
consolidation and in some markets or market segments, to a considerable degree of market 
concentration, if not oligopolies or even monopolies for certain product markets. This creates 
significant risks, where consolidation is allowed to take place before proper competition has 
had a chance to develop. Market concentration in production, import or supply can undermine 
new entrants, curtail liquidity and inhibit true price disclosure. The introduction of market 
pricing will partly increase general price levels and partly prolong price differences where they 
would otherwise not have existed. This, in turn, may lead to efficiency losses both in the short- 
and long-term.
21 Further risks of anti-competitive behaviour exist through cross-border 
ownership links and cross-border contracts between incumbents. In case of links of a dominant 
incumbent to smaller entities in neighbouring countries, there is a risk that the effects of 
dominance from one market will spill over into other markets. 
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Market power is principally addressed in the context of competition policy and law in the EU 
and its member states. Major EU cross-border mergers have been scrutinised by the European 
Commission as the EU’s competition authority. The merger regulation has allowed the 
European Commission to examine some major European mergers and acquisitions with a view 
to their effects on competition. As a result, these mergers have only been approved after the 
companies provided evidence that the new entities would not undermine competition. Among 
the most notable cases were the VEBA/VIAG merger to create E-on, the RWE/HEW merger 
and the stake of EdF in EnBW (see Lowe, 2003). In all cases, the European Commission has 
asked for concessions to address market power (see e.g. Arana Antelo, 2003). However these 
concessions have in many cases been insufficient to mitigate against market power. 
The slowing of market consolidation, however, meant that the merger regulation increasingly 
ceased functioning as a tool to influence market power. The European Commission is now 
forced to rely on other competition competencies such as general antitrust (e.g. joint sales 
agreements/export cartels, territorial or use restrictions or use restrictions) or state aid 
provisions (e.g. cross-subsidies between customer groups or activities, stranded costs, taxation 
regimes).  
Some mergers and acquisitions, however, do not fall under European Commission scrutiny and 
remain a matter of member state authorities. While the European Commission has exhibited a 
consistent approach, there is major discrepancy between member states on what concentration 
is ‘acceptable’. Especially in natural gas, some member states appear to be attracted by 
creating ‘national champions’ on grounds to producing the ‘weight’ to counter the power of an 
increasingly concentrated non-EU/EEA gas production and import industry, which also 
gradually is extending its activity to the EU/EEA market. 
This inconsistency of approaches between member states need to be resolved eventually, even 
more so as national markets integrate, possibly in regional electricity markets or around gas 
hubs initially, and then possibly into an EU-wide market. This process could become part of a 
market monitoring and assessment mechanism, which is proposed and discussed below in 
section 4.6.  
In the absence of EU-wide agreed approaches to market concentration, market power can be 
addressed by a number of existing instruments. First, effective implementation of existing and 
forthcoming legislation and (sectoral) regulation applied by competition and energy regulators 
can contain some of the effects stemming from market power. The most important areas are 
full unbundling and improved terms of third-party access, including an effective cross-border 
trading regime. Where retail prices (for certain customer groups) remain regulated, the 
regulators have a special responsibility to ensure that incumbents do not benefit from excessive 
prices, which would allow them to cross-subsidise their activities in the competitive markets. A 
second element is a high degree of transparency of market information about transmission, 
demand and generation in European electricity markets. This item will be further discussed in 
section 4.3 on wholesale market design.  
4.2  Network regulation  
Network costs for both electricity and natural gas are very substantial. For example, the 
electricity network notably in distribution accounts for approximately 30-50% of the costs 
associated with electricity prices. Similarly, gas pipelines are sensitive to scale and distance. 
Therefore, network regulation especially for distribution is not only important as a RETHINKING THE EU REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET | 27 
 
precondition for competition, including cross-border trade,
22 but also an important tool to 
reduce the costs of energy and to increase public support if cost savings are passed on to 
consumers. 
As regards grid access and the level of access charges, the amending legislation of the new 
electricity and gas directives contains further measures, notably legal unbundling, the 
establishment of a regulator in all member states and the publication of network tariffs. Proper 
implementation of these provisions by member states and their regulatory authorities, together 
with the technical work currently undertaken within the Florence and Madrid Fora is generally 
expected to overcome existing problems with network access, in so far as they existed in some 
member states.  
Experience with incentive regulation in England and Wales and the Nordic countries suggests 
that the potential for cost reductions in transmission and distribution activities is considerable. 
The basic condition should be that notably Distribution Systems Operators (DSOs) but also 
Transmission Systems Operators (TSOs) are provided with incentives to improve their 
efficiency. There are various approaches such as efficient component pricing, in which the 
access price should be equal to the direct incremental cost of access plus the opportunity cost 
of supplying it, or the Ramsey/global price cap, which takes account of the need to cover fixed 
costs and of demand elasticity. Other methodologies exist, such as yardstick and benchmark 
pricing or sliding scale regulation. In any case, it is important that the costs of DSOs and TSOs 
are carefully regulated to prevent them from passing on costs irrespective of their performance.  
As a priority, however, network legislation takes the form of an EC regulation so that it can 
have a Community character and not be subject to ‘creative implementation’ at the national 
level. Thereby cross-border congestion can be effectively met, improving the way the network 
in Europe is being managed. Legislation should be developed as much as possible on the basis 
of benchmarking and best-practice.  
4.3  Wholesale market design 
From the outset, a harmonised wholesale market design was never considered as an objective 
of subsequent electricity and gas directives. Trading was seen as an activity, which is thought 
to be developed on its own, once the regulatory framework for transportation, generation, 
distribution and supply is in place (see Figures 1 and 2 and section 3). Therefore, the directives 
concentrated on the prerequisites of the wholesale market: liberalisation of generation, non-
discriminatory rules for grid access, including a functioning cross-border regime and freedom 
of customers to buy. Trading was subject to general EU and member state provisions that deal 
with trading activity.  
Efficiency of wholesale markets (e.g. power exchanges, gas hubs and OTCs), however, can be 
improved by a number of initiatives. The first is the efficient development of the different 
markets related to trade. For power this includes notably balancing, term, spot, reserve, day 
ahead and intra-day markets while for gas within-day balancing markets and access to storage 
and short and long-term supplies and capacity. With one of these elements missing, market 
participants will not be able to participate in a non-discriminatory way and in general, 
efficiency is compromised.  
The second is transparency, to provide relevant information to all market participants. In the 
field of electricity, relevant information contains actual and historical data on load, cross-
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border flows, balancing power costs, aggregated generation data and urgent market messages 
such as plant or line outages as it is provided in the Nordic market. It is important that 
disclosure of market-sensitive information is provided in a standardised manner so that 
asymmetry of information is minimised or even avoided. For example, NordPool can also 
oblige companies to provide information. In most other markets, these data are only partially 
or not at all provided (Leeds, 2004). The information requirements for the gas market are 
virtually identical (substitute production/import data for generation). All market participants 
(in both gas and electricity) need transparent information on the processes for accessing the 
networks and information from the network operators on their individual accounts. 
In natural gas it is expected that spot markets at regional or national gas hubs will emerge. 
Price differentials between the zones, which would reflect the demand in different zones 
related to the network capacity between the hubs, would lead to trade between hubs and 
thereby competition. The preconditions are that market participants have access to storage, a 
suitable tarification and balancing system for trade between the regions allowing market 
participants access to long-, medium- and short-term gas supplies, including for within-day 
balancing and the market information listed above. Finally, there is a need to maintain 
upstream gas production (i.e. keeping the overall level of production at a certain level).  
Avoiding discrimination for market participants in electricity and gas markets is another 
essential feature. In the financial market sector, this has been addressed by a set of rules to deal 
with manipulation such as insider trading, prevention of market manipulation, segregation of 
accounts and reporting requirements on trades. There, the “Prospectus”, an “EU passport” or a 
document cleared by one national regulator that is then mutually recognised by all member 
states’ supervisory authorities allows the freedom to provide financial services across national 
borders (without the necessity for the firm to set up a national presence) and guarantees the 
freedom of establishment. This could, for example, clear the way for a single supply licence in 
energy. As for electricity and gas trading, in principle non-discrimination can be addressed by 
already-existing EU directives, such as market abuse or the recently adopted Directive on 
Financial Markets,
23 which deal with trading issues and commodity derivatives. Their 
shortcoming is, however, that they are not applicable to commodity trading but only to their 
derivatives.  
4.4 Empowering  end-consumers 
To date, competition in the small consumer segment has been absent in a number of member 
states that had decided not to open this part to competition. This is gradually to change since as 
of 1 July 2004, all commercial customers, and by 1 July 2007, all consumers, will be able to 
freely choose their energy suppliers. But even in those member states that have already fully 
opened their markets, consumers have been facing both structural and technological barriers. 
Structural barriers describe the fact that in most markets retailers and new entrants in general 
found it difficult to compete against dominant incumbents. Principle impediments were 
obstacles to switch providers partly but not only due to the lack of effective network access 
and DSO switching procedures, consumer inertia but also a general actual or perceived lack of 
transparency of different supply contracts (i.e. consumers could not compare different offers). 
Technological barriers relate to the need for metering equipment, at least in the longer-term. 
Although cheap and simple alternatives to sophisticated metering exist, such as load profiling, 
and have been successfully used, real-time accurate metering should enhance small consumers’ 
interest in retail competition. 
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The precondition for complete retail competition is full unbundling, effective non-
discriminatory TPA and a regulatory structure that is effective but also provides certainty and 
simplicity. Therefore, effective empowering of the small consumer market, which could 
unleash new market dynamics is most likely achieved by regulation rather than by 
competition. Full liberalisation of the small consumer market is best helped if existing 
legislation is effectively implemented. Nevertheless, a number of items are most likely to 
facilitate the process. 
A first issue is to ease switching of suppliers by reducing paper work and costs. An important 
element would be to put basic consumer protection rules into place to assure that consumers 
would receive energy even if the supplier goes out of business. In addition, there might be 
some merit to attempt to provide better and more easily accessible information and education 
to consumers by for example creating consumer councils or consumer advisory boards with 
regulators. It can be expected that consumers are more likely to embrace the notion of energy 
market liberalisation if they understand and trust the market and feel represented. Most of these 
tasks appear to be best undertaken by member states and their regulatory authorities, although 
there might be a case for benchmarking and identification of best practice, for example, within 
the CEER processes.  
Empowering consumers might also necessitate different kinds of metering equipment as for 
example in Italy or Sweden – possibly based on online power-measuring devices – able to bill 
real consumption in easy but detailed ways. That should provide better information which 
would assist the choice of supplier. There might be a case for harmonised standards for 
metering equipment, which could generate significant economies of scale, therefore making 
metering equipment cheaper. 
The idea of an EU “single supply licence”, which seeks to reduce transaction costs for 
suppliers by requiring that they only apply once for a licence across the EU, will facilitate the 
supply side by making new entrance easier. This should be pursued further. 
4.5  The cross-border dimension: Cross-border trade and regional 
markets  
The establishment of a common EU cross-border trade regime for both electricity and gas has 
been central to the realisation of an EU internal energy market. Cross-border trade is essential 
to induce competition into national markets, dominated by incumbents. Quite often the 
incumbent in one member state is the new entrant in another. In a legal sense, liberalisation of 
cross-border trade is a core task of the EU and its obligation to achieve an internal market, 
including energy. Cross-border trade is also a key component to achieve efficiency gains at EU 
level as well as a means to improve security of supply through increased flexibility.  
At the same time a cross-border regime has been slow to emerge. For example to date only 8% 
of total electricity consumption is traded across an EU border of which 70% is accounted for 
structural imports of Italy from France. In natural gas, the figure is much higher and amounts 
to 60% although most of the EU’s gas consumption is imported and therefore necessarily 
needs to cross borders to be transported to the designated market. This 60% is, however, 
controlled by a few, mostly incumbent, companies.  
There are several reasons for the slow emergence of cross-border trade, notably in electricity. 
They include insufficient unbundling, lack of effective grid access, the absence of cross-border 
regime and constraints on interconnection capacity (in electricity) and a lack of congestion 
management. With the exception of interconnection capacity, the new electricity and gas 30 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
 
directives, the regulation on cross-border electricity trade and the proposed regulation on cross-
border gas trade have sought to address these issues.  
Interconnections and infrastructure in general have been dealt with by subsequent European 
Commission proposals, of which the latest is currently pending.
24 Following the blackout in 
Italy in September 2003, however, it has been questioned whether encouraging an increase in 
transmission of electricity over long distances is genuinely the best way to promote security of 
supply rather than by better demand management.
25  
Infrastructure constraints are less seen as an obstacle in natural gas than in electricity. In 
natural gas – once full unbundling is effective and the proposed regulation of cross-border 
trade is implemented – it is assumed that trading between regional gas hubs (and their 
associated trading zones) will not be inhibited by interconnection constraints. Price 
differentials between the hubs are likely to reflect the demand in different zones related to the 
network capacity between the hubs.  
Interconnectors  
Cross-border interconnectors can have characteristics of a public good with positive 
externalities. The full exploitation of the internal market depends on cross-border trade, which 
in return necessitates cross-border infrastructure. This applies also to electricity and gas 
infrastructure. This has been recognised by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which has added a 
new chapter on infrastructure, the so-called Trans-European Network (TEN) chapter in Arts. 
154-156 of the current EC Treaty. The provision, however, is weak speaking merely of the 
Community “contributing” to the establishment and development of trans-European networks, 
including energy. In fact, the European Commission under its competencies of TENs sets up a 
list of ‘priority projects of European interest’, which benefit from limited financial support 
mechanisms. Such designation of ‘European interest’, even if associated with limited financial 
support, does not in most cases swing a project. And as the various TEN priority lists have 
shown, there is an inherent tendency that priority projects are designed on the basis of national 
rather than EU priorities. The recent discussions on transport infrastructure projects in the 
context of the European Growth Initiative can be seen as another pointer in this direction.  
In the absence of political will for a more efficient and stronger EU involvement in 
infrastructure, there is still room for a more systematic monitoring and assessment of European 
infrastructure developments and needs. A systematic monitoring of the basis of agreed 
principles and definitions could be a powerful tool to identify infrastructure shortcomings and 
their possible implications, notably on competition and security of supply. Such a monitoring 
and assessment procedure could for example evaluate the competitive implications of merchant 
lines but also identify whether TSOs comply with their obligations of developing the network 
or the security of supply implications of the existing infrastructure.  
Finally, monitoring and assessment for example by CEER could be instrumental in developing 
a credible ‘European interconnector plan’. Such a plan, if supported by TSOs, national 
regulators, the European Commission and ultimately the European Council alike, would most 
likely create political momentum in member states, which could overcome their reluctance to 
build new infrastructure. The current problems with blackouts that Europe is experiencing may 
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be a good argument to bring the message home to member states that new infrastructure is not 
only a question for competition but after all a question of security of supply.  
Another, more formalised approach would be to consider introducing a similar provision like 
the US power market platform on regional transmission planning process (see FERC, 2003). 
The regional transmission planning process is to produce technical assessments of the regional 
grid and support for the authorities that are responsible for citing decisions with impact studies. 
The purpose is to assist the states and market participants by an independent assessment of the 
transmission facilities needed by the region to reliably and economically serve load located in 
the region. A similar mechanism in the EU could constitute an interesting tool to establish the 
‘European view of infrastructure’, as described above. This should be guided by the need to 
maximise transmission capacity in certain borders while not in others, as there is a case of 
setting the conditions for existing export capacity to be transmitted at least in those regions 
where it is critical.  
Regional markets  
There is considerable merit in applying the pragmatic concept of ‘regional markets’ as 
transitional steps towards a true internal market as the European Commission Strategy 
electricity paper has outlined.
26 Regional markets would be designed in terms of geographical 
proximity or harmonisation of the regulatory philosophy and practice as well as trading rules 
and would ultimately develop into ‘regional platforms’. ‘Regional platforms’ would allow 
more room to find tailor-made regional solutions to regional problems, such as, for example, 
regional regulation of TSOs. Gas hubs could provide an equivalent common trading point for 
gas markets. 
Box 4. Examples of divergence and convergence: VAT and greenhouse gas emissions 
trading regimes 
In the context of completing the internal market, the EU attempted to introduce a step-by-step EU 
VAT procedure to replace those operating at national level. Towards this end, the EU created a 
procedure for EU transactions on top of existing national procedures and procedures for trade with 
non-EU countries. The objective was to merge EU with national practices and concentrate on one 
single EU procedure. More than 10 years later, the three procedures still co-exist with little hope to 
end the national procedure. 
Similarly, there were calls by some member states to establish domestic greenhouse gas emissions 
trading schemes, which could over time be linked or merged into a common EU scheme. The result 
was that in the case of the UK at least the national scheme was incompatible with the proposed EU 
scheme, creating a requirement for lengthy transition periods. In addition, there is no common EU 
carbon price for this transition. In the end, it was the Commission's powers under the Treaty’s internal 
market and notably competition laws that ensured that the UK scheme was made compatible with the 
EU scheme (see Egenhofer & Legge, 2002).  
To ensure minimum convergence of different regional markets (see Box 4), some kind of 
boundary conditions – such as general rules on congestion management or transmission 
pricing, on balancing and other markets or on the role of power exchanges – seems 
indispensable. Such rules could be set for example by the European Commission and would in 
effect constitute a ‘standard market design’. While it is unclear whether such rules could be 
formulated as Guidelines and therefore have legal implications, they could in any case be 
formulated by the European Commission as the guardian of the Treaty. If regional markets 
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indeed were to lead to divergence rather than convergence over time, the inevitable results 
would be an increased importance of EC competition law. At the extreme, this could mean that 
regulatory boundaries of regional markets are mainly set by EC competition law. Since EC 
competition law is effectively applied ex post, there is a serious risk of adding uncertainty to 
the regulatory framework.  
4.6  Market monitoring and assessment 
Market monitoring and assessment can be powerful tools to increase transparency, market 
confidence and public support. In the past the European Commission as guardian of the Treaty 
has regularly monitored market developments. To date market monitoring and assessment 
procedures largely leave out participation by member state governments and notably national 
regulatory authorities. One of the exceptions is in the area of security of supply, where the new 
electricity and gas directives mandate monitoring by member states.  
It should therefore be asked whether national regulatory authorities should not be more 
involved in market monitoring and assessment, given their detailed knowledge of the national 
market. The fact that member states are required to establish a regulatory authority offers the 
possibility to introduce market monitoring and assessment at the level of regulatory authorities. 
Inter alia, this move could help to overcome actual or perceived problems of data accuracy and 
lack of consultation related to the European Commission’s benchmarking reports.
27 Moreover, 
market monitoring and assessment undertaken at the level of national regulatory authorities, 
but in close collaboration with the European Commission, hold out the promise that the results 
are likely to be perceived as more authoritative as both national and EU levels of governance 
would have in-depth involvement in the process. The most likely outcome would be an agreed 
and authoritative diagnosis of the situation, which would lead to the identification of action. 
Ultimately, systematic and authoritative market monitoring and assessment are also likely to 
increase transparency and enhance public support. 
Market monitoring and assessment should be undertaken jointly by the European Commission 
and regulators. It would need to be based on agreed rules on the division of responsibilities, 
data collection, stakeholder involvement, benchmarking methodologies and publication of 
results. In order to avoid unnecessary costs, the mechanism for market monitoring and 
assessment should be kept as simple as possible.  
Although the mechanism should be applied to the electricity and gas markets as a whole, there 
are a number of priority areas, including the monitoring and assessment (i.e. definitions) of 
concentration and market power for relevant product and geographical markets. Another area 
could be potential infrastructure shortcomings, which eventually could lead to a ‘European 
interconnector plan’. Finally, there is merit in applying monitoring and assessment to the 
evaluation of the competitive implications of merchant lines, LNG terminals and whether 
TSOs comply with their obligations to develop the network.  
A somewhat similar idea of monitoring and assessment has been proposed by the European 
Commission concerning services of general interest (European Commission, 2004c). In those 
cases, it is proposed that the services of general interest would be regularly evaluated on the 
basis of a specific evaluation methodology. The difference of this approach, however, is that 
the task would not necessarily be shared with other organisations such as the regulators. 
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5.  Security of supply and the environment in a liberal energy market 
Liberalisation necessitates a separation of commercial decisions made by companies and 
judgements about policy and regulation made by government and regulatory bodies. This 
translates into a redefinition of the respective roles of government and company 
policy/regulatory decisions and by extension, a review of policy instruments. Markets can 
actually serve as an effective and efficient tool in achieving policy objectives such as security 
of supply or pollution reduction: governments essentially establish the objectives and set the 
rules that enable market participants to achieve policy objectives (Egenhofer et al., 2004; 
Egenhofer & Legge, 2001). It is essential however that policy instruments work with the grain 
of the market or at least are competition-neutral and transparent. There is a long history of 
government intervention in the energy sector, given its strategic importance. In some cases 
there are still attempts to implement policies to protect domestic coal or nuclear power, to 
promote security of supply above market levels and even to create ‘national champions’ for 
industrial policy, employment or other reasons. Such intervention, however, is likely to distort 
the market, create uncertainty, invite gaming and most importantly distort investment 
decisions.  
The following section highlights key policy and regulatory challenges associated with the 
changing role of government in pursuing policy objectives in liberalised markets in the areas of 
security of supply and the environment. 
5.1  Security of supply 
In general, liberalisation increases security of supply by increasing the number of market 
participants and improving the flexibility of energy systems. Liberalisation may, however, also 
pose new risks, such as reserve capacity or inconsistencies with environmental or other 
policies.  
Moreover, governments may need to re-assess the level of security of supply they seek to 
achieve. Markets make the cost of security of supply more transparent, which in turn can lead 
to a situation in which consumers are prepared to pay a premium for increased security of 
supply or to accept a reduced level of security in exchange for lower prices (Egenhofer et al., 
2004).  
Reserve capacity for power generation 
In the monopolised market structure, capacity shortages were never a problem. The system was 
inherently producing overcapacity in the knowledge that costs could easily be passed on to 
consumers. In competitive markets, the situation is the reverse. Investment decisions for 
generation capacity are based on calculations of profitability. Particularly if peak demand is 
only seldom reached, which by definition is the case for the marginal KWh, incentives to build 
reserve capacity are low. Especially where generation is oligopolistic – which is the case for 
most member state markets – there are strong incentives to keep reserve capacity small as it 
can increase pricing power.  
Theoretically, shortages of generation capacity could be offset via trade, especially since peak-
load capacity is not a problem at the EU aggregate level. However, interconnection capacity 
may not allow this. Moreover, there is a risk that responsibility for reserve capacity will simply 
be shifted from one member state to another (‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy). Therefore a 
better solution is to identify responsibilities for maintaining reserve capacity associated with 
market-based compensation schemes. Such schemes can include capacity payments, purchases 
of peaking units by the TSO, competitive bidding, capacity markets, reliability contracts or 34 | EGENHOFER & GIALOGLOU 
 
capacity subscriptions. These schemes are analysed in greater detail in two other CEPS 
publications.
28 Another largely neglected area is cutting the peaks by demand-side measures, 
including for example interruptible contracts or improved energy efficiency, which increases 
the overall flexibility of the energy system and reduces the need for new plant construction and 
other infrastructure investments. Similarly, decentralised or distributed generation may have a 
positive effect on security of supply by increased flexibility, higher efficiency and the fact that 
decentralised systems are less vulnerable to grid instability, heavy storms (such as those at 
Christmas 1999, in Europe) or terrorist attacks.  
A short description of different capacity mechanisms is contained in Appendix 3 of this report. 
Network obligations  
Unbundling has changed responsibilities for the security of the transmission grid. Generators 
and suppliers as market participants are basically responsible for the short-, medium- and long-
term balance between supply and demand. TSOs on the other hand are responsible for the safe 
and efficient operation of the transmission grid, including ancillary services, which enables the 
market to work. 
Effective electricity markets do not develop over night. Especially during the transition period 
there is greater need for government and regulator activity to monitor reliability, improve price 
signals and adapt regulation if necessary. But there are structural changes related to liberal 
power markets. To facilitate cross-border trade, there is a need for market-based congestion 
management. With a greater number of market participants, there is also a need for appropriate 
ancillary-services specification, including enforceability rules and the definition of the 
relationship between power exchanges and TSOs. While overall efficiency of the system will 
be enhanced by improved price signals, those parts that remain monopolistic, especially the 
distribution and segments of the transmission networks must be properly regulated. Regulation 
must be both consistent across the EU/EEA and provide sufficient incentives for short- and 
long-term development of the network. Crucial elements for achieving a high degree of 
security of supply are network liability rules. They are best set at synchronously interconnected 
areas, due to the different operational needs characterising continental Europe, Scandinavia 
and the British Isles. The regulatory framework at EU level should then take into account this 
fundamental distinction. In addition, there are ‘semi-market-based’ solutions. For example the 
(provisional) Swedish approach with auctions for reserve capacity, conducted by the TSO, is 
being implemented to cover a transition period until a pure market-based system will be 
adopted in 2008. 
Natural gas: Balancing competition with long-term security aspects  
There is a consensus that natural gas growth in Europe will outgrow energy consumption by a 
factor of almost three with predicted growth of 2.8% p.a. for the next 20 years. Russia would 
remain by far the main supplier with supplemental imports coming from the Mediterranean, 
the Caspian and the Middle East, of which a significant share would be via LNG. With 
growing needs of gas imports into the EU – some of which will have to come from far-away 
sources – there is an increasing need for new gas infrastructure such as pipelines and LNG 
terminals. Recent projections of gas demand in an enlarged Europe and the corresponding need 
for additional imports assume a total investment of €150 to 200 billion for extending and 
building required infrastructure in pipeline links and LNG-receiving facilities for the next two 
decades (Cayrade, 2004, pp. 2-5). This raises notably two issues. The first is the regulatory 
strategy regarding gas merchant lines – infrastructure especially – and LNG terminals (ibid., 
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pp. 4-6, 8-9). The second is how to foster the relationship between the EU and its main 
suppliers.  
As for the regulatory strategy for gas infrastructure, Article 22 of the new gas directive 
provides the opportunity to exempt privately-financed interconnectors between member states 
from TPA rules. Such privately-financed infrastructure of merchant lines is seen as crucial for 
meeting the EU’s expected import requirements. Merchant lines can however be problematic 
from a competition point of view in that they can create or reinforce a dominant position (e.g. 
CEER, 2003). This potential problem will need further attention.  
As to the second issue – EU relations with supplier countries – a specific problem has been the 
destination clauses for long-term gas contracts, which ‘earmark’ supplies to exclusive sale in a 
designated area, mostly a member state market. The European Commission has judged them as 
anti-competitive as they are seen as contrary to Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Justification 
from a producer country or company point of view is that in the absence of a true internal gas 
markets, there continue to exist national markets with different price levels, thereby allowing 
for windfall profits.
29 This would be the case for example if an importer contracts for a certain 
volume of gas at a price that is appropriate for the market in question but instead of selling the 
gas in the designated market, would sell it in a market where higher prices can be achieved.
30 
Destination clauses on the one hand avoid windfall profits, but it seems difficult to justify this 
argument and they might slow down the creation of an internal gas market by helping to 
‘freeze’ market shares.  
A restrictive position by the European Commission, however, may have a detrimental effect on 
relations with the EU’s external suppliers. Such relations are crucial to cope with the expected 
increased dependency on imports in natural gas. On the other hand, it will be difficult for the 
European Commission to accept a situation where destination clauses undermine competition 
in EU natural gas markets. The issue would most likely be solved if transportation companies 
have a less dominant position as intermediaries between producers, traders and final customers 
and if producers (e.g. Gazprom or Sonartrach) are able to sell directly in consumer markets. 
Hence, further progress towards the completion of the internal gas market will facilitate a 
solution.  
Gas import dependence on politically unstable countries  
Liberalisation of electricity markets has been increasing the share of natural gas in the 
generation mix. This in turn has raised the import dependence of natural gas, most of which 
will come from politically unstable or possibly unreliable countries.  
Currently, security of supply is dealt with by specifying minimum levels of storage obligations 
and/or maximum levels of import dependence from a single source, in effect a command-and-
control measure, which does not distinguish between different customer groups. However, 
assigning equal obligations on all companies, independent of the structure of their customers, 
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seems excessive. Not all customers need to be protected against supply disruptions to the same 
degree. It is sufficient to oblige gas suppliers to protect priority customers (i.e. households) in 
case of crisis. It can be left to non-priority customers (e.g. industry or power generators) to 
decide on whether to have the supplier insure against potential risks and pay for it or whether 
they prefer to manage supply risks themselves in return for a lower price. If a distinction 
between priority and non-priority customers is made, this could mean that as long as a gas 
supply company keeps its exposure to a possible ‘risky’ resource (to be defined by 
governments) lower as the share of priority over total customers, there is no need for 
government measures. In case of a crisis of the risky resource, the gas supply company would 
still have sufficient supply to serve priority customers (i.e. households). Those gas suppliers 
that have a surplus of non-priority customers, could even trade their margin of safe supplies to 
those suppliers that are over-exposed (Luciani, 2004 and Stern, 2002).  
5.2 The  environment 
There are many environmental impacts from the production and consumption of natural gas 
and electricity. These include CO2, NOx or SO2 from power generation or methane emissions 
from gas production and transport and the risk of nuclear radiation, to name but a few. 
Historically, environmental policy has been addressed by command-and-control measures, i.e. 
direct regulation. Since the 1980s, there has been a gradual trend where direct regulation is 
increasingly being replaced by market-based instruments, such as taxes, tradable permits, 
support schemes or tax breaks. Market-based instruments are perceived as more cost-effective 
and creating better incentives to develop new and innovative technologies (‘dynamic 
efficiency’). However, market-based instruments are not always a panacea. The basic 
preconditions are careful design and efficient implementation in order to ensure that market-
based instruments maintain a ‘competition-neutral’ character in as much as possible.  
The EU emissions trading scheme  
The concept of emissions trading has traditionally been supported by its proponents as a means 
to achieve climate change policy in the most cost-effective and market-friendly way. It has also 
been considered as an effective way of internalising the external costs.  
The EU emissions trading scheme, however, leaves a high degree of discretion to member 
states. During implementation, notably in the allocation of allowances, it became increasingly 
apparent that member states will treat a number of discretionary items in different ways. These 
include banking, the treatment of new entrants and closure, the classification of installations, 
the ‘legal definition’ of allowances as well as monitoring, reporting and verification.  
There is initial evidence that this could lead to distortions between member states, which could 
feed back into power markets. For example, different rules for new entrants and closures across 
member states provide incentives for gaming while different definitions of installations or the 
legal treatment of allowances will lead to a situation in which companies from the same sector 
within the EU are differently affected by the EU ETS.  
The most important area of concern are the rules governing how member states allocate 
allowances for free to companies (i.e. ‘grandfathering’). Grandfathering affects the different 
market participants in the energy market in very different ways. The incumbent generator will 
increase its revenue (windfall effect) to the detriment of energy-intensive companies, which 
face cost increases based on the carbon value of marginal plant. Energy traders (or retailers) 
also face cost increases due to higher wholesale prices and smaller margins. ‘Independent’
31 
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energy-traders, in particular, face the worst-case scenario with respect to their competitive 
position compared to a more vertically-integrated trading company (i.e. a company directly 
linked to generators). The effect may be less competition in retail markets, whereas 
competition at retail (and wholesale) level is crucial for competition in power markets. A 
worrying factor is that the ‘windfall effect’ strengthens the market position of the incumbents 
to such a degree that it could undermine competition and thereby inhibit new entrants.
32  
Support for renewables  
Support for renewables in power generation in most member states is directly linked to prices, 
mainly through feed-in laws. Feed-in tariffs have been successful in instigating greater 
utilisation of renewables for power generation. This is not to say, however, that such a measure 
is seen by all as a panacea, or as something that should be a permanent feature. On the one 
hand, feed-in tariffs fulfil their purpose of promoting renewables in the context of EU energy 
and environmental policy. On the other hand, however, viewed through the lens of internal 
market provisions, national feed-in or other domestic support schemes may potentially distort 
the internal market and may even hamper cross-border trade.  
The European Court of Justice’s decision in March 2001 (see ECJ case C-379/98), in favour of 
the German federal feed-in law, seems to permit this form of support for the immediate future, 
although some market participants feel that such laws may not be compatible with a fully 
liberalised internal energy market.
33 Meanwhile, some member states are switching from price 
support systems for wind energy to tradable green certificate schemes, which eventually could 
lead into a pan-European trading scheme. While in theory such schemes should achieve the 
environmental objectives, they also need to prove that they will aid towards the establishment 
of sustainable generation technologies and are complementary with longer-term policies 
focusing on efficiency and innovation. It should be mentioned that the overall level of 
subsidies going to the renewables sector in Europe needs to be compared to the direct and 
indirect subsidies given to other fuels. For example, the fossil fuel sector is receiving very 
large direct and indirect subsidies, which may have a distorting effect on fuel choices for 
electricity generation and therefore provide further concerns with regard to market distortions. 
6.  Adapting the institutional framework of EU electricity and gas 
market regulation  
Since EU network industry liberalisation started in the mid-1980s, there has been a question 
about the legal and institutional framework within which EU policy is to take place. Different 
‘regulatory’ philosophies and approaches have prevailed across member states and have in 
some cases led to asymmetric development of the framework as well as implementation. 
6.1 The  institutional  framework: A plethora of competencies 
EU liberalisation has to be agreed in complex negotiations between the European Commission, 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, which de facto – as the EU decision-
making process in general – is consensus-oriented. This makes the decision-making process 
not only slow but it also tends to lead to minimalist outcomes for those policy areas where a 
broad consensus is missing.  
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Once the decisions have been taken, implementation is largely left to member states, but 
coordinated for example via comitology procedures
34 or informal processes and supervised by 
the European Commission through the direct application of Community law, such as 
competition rules (see Figure 5). In essence, this approach leaves considerable discretion to 
member states to develop their regulatory philosophy and practice. This is consistent with the 
subsidiarity principle,
35 governing the assignment of competencies between the EU and 
member states.  
The instruments considered as proportional in electricity and gas market regulation were EU 
framework legislation and coordination between the European Commission and national 
regulatory authorities. As a complement, a number of semi-formal or informal processes have 
been launched – often on the initiative of the European Commission. These include attempts at 
cooperation between national regulators in the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER) and the Florence and Madrid Fora, where stakeholders attempted to find a consensus 
on largely technical issues. Associations have also been formed among transmissions systems 
operators for electricity and gas, ETSO and GTE respectively, and energy traders, e.g. EFET to 
forge common European solutions.
36 
The effectiveness of such a process depends on the degree of consensus between member 
states and determines, as a result, whether a ‘common and agreed’ regulatory philosophy and 
practice can be achieved across member states. Electricity and gas market liberalisation, 
however, has been particularly controversial. It took the Florence European Council (June 
1996) to agree on the first electricity directive and the Barcelona European Council (March 
2002) to set the target date for full market opening. Moreover, while European Council 
agreements set objectives, they say little or nothing about the tools to apply. Different member 
states continued to follow distinct rules with differing capacities and willingness to intervene. 
And these dissimilar rules and uncertainty in one member state inevitably spill over into the 
whole sector.  
Table 1 summarises a number of shortcomings. In the first instance, there were insufficient 
rules in some member states from the outset. This included for example TPA and unbundling 
provisions. Second, implementation or transposition of EU laws has sometimes been late or 
insufficient. Both shortcomings increase uncertainty over the future and undermine market 
confidence. A third set of drawbacks are the risk of inconsistencies between the EU and 
member states and among member states. Areas worth mentioning include the application of 
TPA, the powers and independence of regulatory authorities or definitions of dominance and 
relevant markets. Different interpretations, especially if they prevail, are likely to lead to trade 
distortions and uncertainty and by extension to inefficient markets. Finally, there appears to be 
insufficient coordination in some areas such as infrastructure planning.  
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35 Enshrined in Art. 5 of the EC Treaty, which states that for shared competencies “only if and in so far 
as the objective of the proposed actions cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states” the EU shall 
take action. And if the EU takes action, it should apply the instrument that has the least ‘centralising’ 
effect (proportionality principle). 
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Table 1. Actual and perceived shortcomings in the internal energy market as a result of the 
institutional context 
Shortcomings Effects  Causes    Remedies 
Insufficient rules  Sub-optimal market rules;  
Uncertainty over the future 
Consensus-centred 
co-decision 
Long-term strategy including 
credible implementation plan  
Late or insufficient 
implementation 
Uncertainty over the future  Insufficient 
institutional capacity 
Clear signal that shortcoming 
is addressed (precondition: 
institutional capacity) 
Inconsistencies 
(between EU & MS and 
between MS), e.g. 
application of TPA  
Inefficient market (e.g. 
distortions) 
No agreed regulatory 
philosophy and 
practice; 




tion between MS, e.g. 
infrastructure plan 




procedures and/or higher 
degree of centralisation 
 
While many of the initial drawbacks have been addressed by the new directives, there are still 
a number of areas – as discussed in sections 4 and 5 – that need to be settled within the EU 
either through improved coordination or a higher degree of centralisation. This raises the issue 
of the institutional framework. In the following section, we provide a first indicative proposal 
for institutional adaptation.  
6.2  Different models for a ‘European regulatory authority’ 
Challenges for the institutional framework exist not only for electricity and gas but are 
common – to some extent – for other network industries. Consequently, there have been 
attempts in other markets to design appropriate ‘regulatory institutional settings’ at European 
level. These include notable examples from telecoms, i.e. the European Regulators Group 
(ERG) and financial services, i.e. the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). 
The two examples are described in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively. The ERG is built on 
voluntary coordination of best-practice regulation by national regulators in close cooperation 
with the European Commission. CESR has chosen a different route. It has been established as 
an independent advisory group with the mandate to draft policy recommendations on technical 
issues (for the European Commission) and is invited to give its members’ opinion on proposed 
legislation.  
While both ERG and CESR have their merits, theoretically other concepts for a ‘European 
model of a regulatory authority’ are possible, as discussed below.  
The first option is to create an outright UK-style independent regulator (Eurenergy) as an EU 
agency supervised by the European Parliament and/or member states. This option is highly 
unlikely for both political and constitutional/legal reasons. It is hard to see how member states 
could accept an EU ‘super regulator’, having already invested in national regulators and when 
member states are loathe to delegate powers to the EU. In addition, the European Commission 
would most likely be opposed to such a move as it would be seen as curtailing Commission 
powers. In any case, such a decision would need a revision of the EU Treaty as result of the 
Meroni doctrine, which is interpreted in a way that prohibits the delegation of executive 
powers to independent agencies.
37  
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The second option is to integrate a regulatory office into the European Commission as part of 
competition policy authority (European Commission Directorate General for Network Industry 
Regulation – DG NETREG). While this could overcome potential European Commission 
reluctance, this option seems equally highly unlikely as it would imply that member states 
would equally delegate far-reaching powers to the European Commission.  
A third option could be the creation of a European System of Energy Regulators (ESER), i.e. 
the gradual integration of national regulators into an EU system, which might eventually 
‘harden’ to a European Regulator. Such a body could grow out of the Council or the 
Commission or the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER). While it appears as a 
pragmatic, step by step approach, over time it would raise issues of legitimacy and political 
accountability. Ultimately, also the ESER approach would collide with the Meroni doctrine.  
The fourth option is to refine existing structures, therefore remaining fully within the existing 
Treaty framework (incremental institutional adaptation). This could entail institutional 
adaptation of the existing structures, notably at implementation level. This seems to be in line 
with current political preferences.
38 Such institutional adaptation would most likely be based 
on comitology procedures – as in the case of the Regulation on cross-border electricity trade – 
and cooperation between the European Commission and national regulators. This latter 
cooperation has already been formalised by the creation of the European Regulators Group for 
Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). ERGEG was set up by the European Commission in November 
2003 as an independent advisory group for internal energy market matters. While the creation 
of ERGEG appears to apply the ERG model from telecoms (see Appendix 1), it is imaginable 
that CEER as institution could play a more independent role vis-à-vis the European 
Commission than ERG currently does (Kent, 2003). That would bring CEER closer to the 
CESR model applied in financial markets (see Appendix 2).  
The fifth option is to progressively integrate national regulatory authorities in parallel to the 
development of regional markets. This would mean the establishment of collaborative 
frameworks of regulators at regional level (i.e. regional CEERs). This would raise issues 
related to ensuring consistency of the regulatory strategies for regional CEERs as well as 
provisions to ensure institutional integrity within the European CEERs. Most likely, this would 
mean that overall boundary conditions would need to be set by some sort of EU framework 
law.  
A final and sixth option (bundling of competencies) is to identify the subject matter where a 
bundling through agencies or other institutional set-up is principally justified. According to the 
‘Rapport Stoffaës’ (2003), the Europeanisation of institutions could add particular value by: 1) 
reinforcing the Commission’s role as the responsible body for undertaking negotiations with 
third countries, 2) affirming the independence of regulatory authorities from both the European 
Commission and member states, 3) reducing complexity of the current system, and 4) bundling 
                                                                                                                                                                        
powers involving a margin of political judgement. The Meroni doctrine goes back to a 1958 European 
Court of Justice judgement and has been applied ever since also by the European Commission. This is 
supported by all the memoranda from the Commission’s Legal Service and also by the main literature on 
Community law. See for example Lenaerts (1993), who accepts that agencies are useful but regards 
them as ‘internal bodies’ in the institutional architecture (p. 40) or also the recent memorandum of the 
Legal Service of 29 September 2000, in reaction to the announcement of the White Paper on 
Governance. For full details, see Yataganas (2001). 
38 The European Commission White Paper on “EU policy on services of general interest” concludes on 
page 24 that “there is a large consensus that there is no need for the creation of a European regulatory 
authority at this stage. Networks of national regulators coordinated at European level seem to be the 
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technical expertise within EU bodies. Such an approach could most likely be implemented 
within the current Treaty as well as within the new Constitutional Treaty without even 
discarding the Meroni doctrine. Furthermore, it would be in line with current EU policies such 
as the clarification of competencies, increased efficiency of regulation as well as subsidiarity. 
6.3  Is there a case for institutional adaptation? 
At this stage there is little reason to believe that options 1-3 (e.g. Eurenergy, DG NETREG or 
ESER) will be politically feasible. Option 5 (EU competency on services of general economic 
interest) remains uncertain as it is closely related to the adoption and ratification of the 
European Constitution. And even if the Constitution is adopted and ratified, this will not occur 
for a significant length of time. And even then, it is highly uncertain that member states will 
agree on a common policy, let alone the creation of a European Regulator.  
Option 4 (incremental institutional adaptation) is already being implemented, as illustrated by 
the creation of ERGEG. To date, however, it is not certain whether ERGEG will develop more 
along the lines of the CESR model or that of ERG. Both have their shortcomings. In ERG, 
decision-making is by consensus, which means that coordination remains voluntarily, raising 
doubts about the commitment of member state regulatory authorities to the ERG. Thus, the 
European Commission remains dependent on the political will of regulatory authorities (for 
details, see Appendix 1). While the new regulatory structure for financial markets (i.e. the 
CESR model) has been perceived as a breakthrough for Community legislation, close 
monitoring of its modus operandi have revealed a number of drawbacks. At first, the approach 
can at times be too detailed, thereby adding complexity rather than speeding up a regulatory 
response. The fact that decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis can make it difficult to 
identify the appropriate level for decision-making (e.g. framework, implementation, etc.). 
Finally, the disparity of integration between wholesale and retail financial markets is impeding 
the promotion of one type of legislation and quite often a differentiated approach has to be 
followed.  
Option 5 (regional CEERs) needs to be seen in the broader context of the creation of regional 
markets, which was analysed in section 4. In any case, it would raise questions related to the 
consistency of regulatory strategies for ‘regional CEERs’ as well as the provisions to ensure 
institutional integrity within the ‘European’ CEER. 
Option 6 (bundling of competencies) could most likely be implemented within the current 
Treaty as well as within the new Constitutional Treaty (as demonstrated above). There is 
however a need for political will. 
In conclusion, many of the theoretical options available to adapt the institutional framework 
are politically hard to realise. Others might improve the coordination somewhat but risk 
increasing complexity and transaction costs, not to mention the associated issues of democratic 
legitimacy. In the end, institutional developments will depend on political will. As long as 
there is insufficient political will to move towards a more coherent and efficient institutional 
framework and especially as long as the EU adheres to the Meroni doctrine, which prohibits 
EU executive agencies, the only way forward appears to be the bundling of competencies.  
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Appendix 1. European Regulators Group 
The creation of the European Regulators Group (ERG) in the telecoms sector originated from 
the perceived need for greater EU-wide alignment of sector-specific regulation with standard 
competition principles. Thus, the ERG should be seen as part of the institutional adaptation 
within the context of achieving greater co-ordination of national regulatory practices through 
the consistent application of the new European regulatory framework (Groebel, 2002). The 
ERG basically remains an Advisory Group, whose authority rests on consensus rather than a 
real regulatory body making enforceable decisions. The ERG works through the formulation of 
common positions, in the form of self-binding declarations of intent, which are expected to 
exert ‘moral pressure’ on the members. It does not take legally binding decisions. 
Nevertheless, the ERG could become critical in ensuring consistency of the application of EU 
law by national regulatory authorities.  
The ERG was set up by the European Commission
39 and came into operation in October 2002. 
According to the Decision, the Group is to provide an interface between the national regulatory 
authorities and the Commission. Members comprise the heads of the relevant national 
regulatory authorities. The Commission is represented but does not have a vote. The 
Chairperson is elected from the national regulatory authorities. The ERG can be seen as a 
complement to comitology committees, which are staffed with member states’ 
representatives.
40 The ERG is financially fully dependent on the European Commission and 
receives its funds from the EU budget. It currently has a one-person secretariat in Brussels.  
It is too early to judge its impact. Given that the secretariat is small, however, it appears that it 
would indeed only operate as a light coordination body between regulatory authorities and the 
European Commission. The fact that the budget is paid for by the EU raises two questions. The 
first is about the commitment of all member state regulatory authority to the ERG. The second 
concerns the body’s independence from the European Commission. 
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Communities (L 200/38) on 30 July 2002. 
40 The ERG is required to work closely together with the relevant comitology committees, such as the 
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Appendix 2. The Committee of European Securities Regulators  
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was set up as a consequence of the 
realisation among financial market participants that developments in the sector can be far too 
quick for legislation to ‘catch up’. Securities markets are sophisticated markets with mainly 
private market participants, including ‘network owners’ such as stock exchanges or clearing 
procedures. There are only a few public service obligations attached. Market participants rely 
to a large extent on reputation – worldwide – and therefore self-regulation is both an efficient 
and effective tool. The creation of the CESR was greatly helped by the fact that the financial 
markets have been mature and that there was a political will and agreement on some sort of EU 
level of governance.  
Integration of EU financial markets was proposed first by the European Commission 1999 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) (European Commission, 1999) and agreed during 
several European Council meetings. Full implementation of FSAP is foreseen for 2005. The 
regulatory framework for securities markets was undertaken in a so-called Committee of Wise 
Men (Lamfalussy Group), which dealt with both substantive (i.e. proposals for appropriate 
implementation of regulation) and institutional (i.e. convergence and cooperation in day-to-day 
implementation) issues.  
The new regulatory structure  
The new regulatory structure designed by the Lamfalussy Group identified four different levels 
of legislation and regulation (see Box A.1 on the new regulatory structure). Level 1 is 
framework legislation, level 2 contain implementation measures, level 3 ensures consistency 
between levels 1 and 2 and level 4 relates to measures to promote enforcement of Community 
law, all backed up by the newly created CESR. 
Level 1 is standard co-decision where the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
agree on framework principles. The ‘Lamfalussy approach’ has been to delegate technical 
implementation measures to level 2, getting closer to regulatory powers. This also included the 
goal to make as much use as possible of level 2, ensuring that technical provisions are kept up 
to date with market and supervisory developments (e.g. competition law).  
Given that technical regulation can have and in fact often has a major impact on market 
structure and competition, the European Parliament has been concerned that level 2 measures 
remain in line with level 1 framework laws. The Commission and the Council of Ministers 
have therefore accepted the principles of full European Parliament information and public 
consultation throughout the process under level 2.
41  
In fact, CESR adds on to the comitology committee (i.e. European Securities Committee), a 
more independent, more member-state driven advisory committee. While on the face of it, 
legislation and implementation rests with the standard procedures (co-decision and 
comitology), CESR has brought two important adaptations. Not only does CESR play a major 
role in ensuring coordination between levels 1 and 2. The European Commission also can 
entrust CESR – under certain conditions – to prepare level 2 measures. In fact, this constitutes 
a short-cut of the EU decision-making process, in that the member states are more likely to 
accept what CESR has proposed than going through the comitology procedures. Given that 
there is close cooperation between the European Commission, the European Securities 
Committee and CESR, agreement among these three is almost synonymous with a decision.  
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Box A.1 European securities market regulation  
The four levels of the ‘Lamfalussy approach’: 
•  Level 1 consists of framework legislation (regulations and directives) adopted under the co-
decision procedure by the Council and the European Parliament.  
•  Level 2 deals with implementing measures decided by the European Securities Committee. 
•  Level 3 is concerned with ensuring that levels 1 and 2 are consistently and timely implemented 
by the respective national authorities. This is done by the interaction of the European Securities 
Committee and CESR. 
•  Level 4 is where the EC and member states endeavour to promote the enforcement of Community 
law. 
 
The working of CESR 
The CESR was established by Commission decision in June 2001,
42 as an independent body 
for reflection, debate and advice for the European Commission in the field of securities 
markets. The overall objective is to ensure more effective cooperation between national 
supervisors and thus improve day-to-day implementation of Community legislation in member 
states. Inter alia, CESR is to carry out peer reviews and promote best practice. CESR issues 
guidelines, recommendations and standards that its members will introduce in their regulatory 
practices on a voluntary basis. In addition, CESR acts as an independent advisory group to 
assist the Commission in particular in its preparation of draft implementing measures, the so-
called ‘level 2’ measures. There is an obligation for consultation with market participants, 
consumers and end-users, putting it a level with the European Commission in this respect. 
There is close cooperation between CESR and the European Commission with the latter 
participating in all meetings, although without voting rights. 
CESR is fully financed by the national regulatory authorities. CESR operates independently of 
the European Commission, with a secretariat in Paris of currently 15 permanent employees, in 
addition to seconded staff. Although principally CESR works on the basis of consensus, this is 
not always the case. However, there is an obligation to elaborate any dissenting opinions of 
individual members. 
Drawbacks of the ‘Lamfalussy’ approach 
The new regulatory structure for financial markets has been perceived as a breakthrough for 
Community legislation. Nevertheless, close monitoring of its modus operandi reveals a number 
of drawbacks. The four-level approach can at times be too detailed, thereby adding complexity 
rather than speeding up a regulatory response. Due to the fact that decisions are taken on a 
case-by-case basis, it can be difficult to decide which legislation should be perceived as 
‘framework legislation’ (level 1), and which as ‘implementing measures’ (level 2 subject to 
comitology, European Securities Committee). Moreover, as in energy markets, the disparity 
between wholesale and retail financial markets is impeding the promotion of one type of 
legislation for the whole market. It must be underlined, however, that due to its recent 
establishment, the Lamfalussy approach cannot yet be assessed on whether it is producing a 
real change vis-à-vis the previous arrangements.  
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Appendix 3. Options for Capacity Mechanisms
43 
Mothball reserve 
One option that often is proposed is a so-called ‘mothball reserve’, a collection of mothballed, 
old plants that can be returned to service if necessary. The question is under what conditions 
this reserve is deployed. If the market is to perform its regular task and invest in generation 
capacity, it should be able to rely upon periodical price spikes to finance its investment in 
peaking units. This means that the reserve should only be deployed at a high price, namely a 
price equal to the value of lost load. This raises two issues. First, it may be politically 
unsustainable to allow prices to rise this high for any length of time if they can be lowered by 
deploying the mothball reserve. After all, the reserve will be something of a public facility. 
The second issue is that the incentive to withhold capacity by market parties will not be 
eliminated until the deployment price of the mothball reserve is reached. Nevertheless, if the 
reserve is to be deployed at any lower price, it will reduce the incentive to invest. This scenario 
would create a need for a larger reserve. 
Capacity payments 
A better prospect is offered by methods that convert the irregular revenues from price spikes to 
a constant revenue stream for generation companies. A primitive form consists of capacity 
payments, as tried in Spain and several South-American countries and, in a different form, in 
the former England and Wales Pool. A disadvantage of these payments is that their effect is 
uncertain: the payments do not necessarily lead to more investment. Instead of fixing the 
payment level and leaving the investment level to be decided by the generation market, it is 
more effective to do the reverse. The most promising capacity mechanisms provide a clear 
signal to the generation market regarding the demand for capacity, but leave it to the market to 
finance it. 
Capacity requirements 
The only system that has been tried in practice and that appears to work is the system of 
capacity requirements, such as the installed capacity (ICAP) system used by PJM on the US 
East Coast. (For an introduction, see for instance Besser et al., 2002.) In this system, the retail 
companies are required to purchase a certain percentage of reserve capacity. The percentage is 
determined by the regulator. This reveals the demand for reserve capacity. The cost of 
providing the reserve capacity is passed along to the consumers by the retail companies who 
contract the capacity. The reserve capacity is tradable and may consist of an interruptible load. 
Reliability contracts 
A disadvantage of capacity requirements is that they do not provide an incentive to maximize 
the availability of reserve capacity. An improvement in this respect is provided by reliability 
contracts, a system of call options that the system operator purchases from the generation 
companies (Vázquez et al., 2002). When the options are called, the producers are required to 
pay the system operator the difference between the market price and the strike price. Operating 
power plants are a perfect hedge for the generators: their net income is equal to the strike price. 
Generation companies that have sold options that are not covered by available generation 
capacity when the options are called, lose on those options. This provides generation 
companies with an incentive to sell an option volume that is equal to the available volume of 
the generation capacity that they control. A second advantage is that the generation companies 
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receive an incentive to maximise the availability of their generation units during periods of 
scarcity. Overall generation adequacy is determined by the system operator, by the volume of 
options that the operator purchases. 
Capacity subscriptions 
Where the previous two systems still contain an element of central coordination, a system of 
capacity subscriptions leaves all variables to the market (Doorman, 2000). In fact, this system 
may be considered more market-oriented than a traditional, unregulated electricity market, 
because it allows consumers to choose their level of generation adequacy. In this system, each 
customer needs to purchase an electronic fuse, which can limit his/her electricity use. The fuses 
are activated by the system operator during periods of scarcity. Customers can choose the size 
of their fuses. The fuses are sold by generation companies and need to be covered by available 
generation capacity. Thus, the market for fuses indicates the total demand for generation 
capacity and provides generation companies with fixed revenues to cover their investments. 
This system turns the security of supply into a private good: consumers can choose their own 
level of generation capacity that they want to have reliably available. The drawback of this 
system, compared with the previous options, is that it is more elaborate, as it requires the 
installation of an electronic fuse at each customer site. A final option is not to end the 
consumer franchise (Newbery, 2002). With captive consumers, the free-rider problem is 
solved. Then the retail companies can cover their full projected demand with long-term 
contracts. But this option will not prove popular with those in favour of a fully liberalised 
market. 
The discussed capacity mechanisms all have the limitation that they have limited effect when 
they are implemented in the presence of significant import volumes. To be both effective and 
economically efficient, an interconnected system would need to implement a capacity 
mechanism for its whole area.  
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Appendix 4. Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
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Acceleration package: A set of legislative initiatives by the European Commission aiming at the 
structural reform of the Internal Electricity and Gas market. For further information, see section 2.3 
of this report. 
Access Charge: Term related to network access, it is a charge paid by all market participants 
withdrawing energy from the TSO-controlled grid. The access charge will recover the portion of a 
utility’s transmission revenue requirement not recovered through the variable usage charge. 
Ancillary services: Services that ensure reliability and support the transmission of electricity from 
generation sites to customer loads. Such services may include load regulation, spinning reserve, 
non-spinning reserve, replacement reserve and voltage support. 
Base load: The minimum amount of electric power delivered or required over a given period of 
time at a steady rate.  
Base load capacity: The generating equipment normally operated to serve loads on an around-the-
clock basis.  
Base load plant: A plant, usually housing high-efficiency steam-electric units, which is normally 
operated to take all or part of the minimum load of a system, and which consequently produces 
electricity at an essentially constant rate and runs continuously. These units are operated to 
maximise system mechanical and thermal efficiency and minimise system operating costs.  
Base load unit: A power generating facility that is intended to run constantly at near capacity 
levels, as much of the time as possible. 
Biofuels: Liquid fuels and blending components produced from biomass (plant) feedstocks, used 
primarily for transportation.  
Biomass: Organic non-fossil material of biological origin constituting a renewable energy source.  
Blackout: A power loss affecting many electricity consumers over a large geographical area for a 
significant period of time. 
Broker: A retail agent who buys and sells power. The agent may also aggregate customers and 
arrange for transmission, firming and other ancillary services as needed but does not take title to 
any of the power sold. 
Bundled utility service (electric): A means of operation whereby energy, transmission, and 
distribution services, as well as ancillary and retail services are provided by one entity. 
Call-back: A provision included in some power sale contracts that let the supplier stop delivery 
when the power is needed to meet certain other obligations. 
Capacity: The amount of electric power for which a generating unit, generating station, or other 
electrical apparatus is rated either by the user or manufacturer. The term is also used for the total 
volume of natural gas that can flow through a pipeline over a given amount of time, considering 
such factors as compression and pipeline size.  
There are various types of electricity capacity:  
Installed (or nameplate) capacity: The total manufacturer-rated capacities of equipment such 
as turbines, generators, condensers, transformers and other system components.  
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Peaking capacity: The capacity of generating equipment intended for operation during the 
hours of highest daily, weekly or seasonal loads.  
Purchased capacity: The amount of energy and capacity available for purchase from outside 
the system. 
Reserve capacity: Extra generating capacity available to meet peak or abnormally high 
demands for power and to generate power during scheduled or unscheduled outages. Units 
available for service, but not maintained at operating temperature, are termed ‘cold’. Those 
units that are ready and available for service, though not in actual operation, are termed ‘hot’. 
Capacity charge: An element in a two-part pricing method used in capacity transactions (energy 
charge is the other element). The capacity charge, sometimes called ‘demand charge’, is assessed 
on the amount of capacity being purchased.  
Capacity factor: The ratio of the electrical energy produced by a generating unit for the period of 
time considered to the electrical energy that could have been produced at continuous full power 
operation during the same period.  
Capacity transaction: The acquisition of a specified quantity of generating capacity from another 
utility for a specified period of time. The utility selling the power is obligated to make available to 
the buyer a specified quantity of power. 
Dependable capacity: The system’s ability to carry the electric power for the time and period 
specific, when related to the characteristics of the load to be supplied. Dependable capacity is 
determined by such factors as capability, operating power factor, weather and the portion of the 
load the station is to supply.  
Captive customer: A customer who does not have realistic alternatives to buying power from the 
local utility, even if that customer had the legal right to buy from competitors. 
Carbon intensity: The amount of carbon by weight emitted per unit of energy consumed. A 
common measure of carbon intensity is weight of carbon per British thermal unit (Btu) of energy.
45 
Carbon sequestration: The fixation of atmospheric carbon dioxide in a carbon sink through 
biological or physical processes. 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR): CESR has the tasks of improving 
coordination (effective supervision and enforcement of the EU single market) among national 
regulators and advising the European Commission on drafting implementing measures of EU 
framework directives in the field of securities. For more information: http://www.cesr-eu.org/. 
Cogeneration: The production of electrical energy and another form of useful energy (such as heat 
or steam) through the sequential use of energy. 
Congestion: A condition that occurs when insufficient transfer capacity is available to implement 
all of the preferred schedules for electricity transmission simultaneously. 
Congestion management: Alleviation of congestion by the TSO. 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER): The Council deals with internal energy 
market matters and in particular with the implementation and development of the EU electricity and 
natural gas directives (see also ERGEG).  
Regional CEER(s): A regulatory approach whereupon regulators of national markets (or regions) 
that comprise a regional market (as defined by the European Commission) sit together to decide on 
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tariffication methodologies and fees, congestion management and other issues that concern the 
operation of the regional market in question. The tangible outcome of this approach would be the 
creation of regional platforms,  i.e. tailor-made regional solutions to accommodate regional 
specificities in order to further integrate markets, and eventually lead to a single market. 
Customer choice: The right of customers to purchase energy from a supplier other than their 
traditional supplier or from more than one seller in the retail market. 
DG NETREG: DG NETREG is among the regulatory options (determining the shape, character 
and competences of future European energy regulation) presented in this report. According to it, the 
regulator is integrated into the European Commission as part of competition policy authority 
(‘European Commission Directorate General for Network Industry Regulation - DG NETREG’). 
Day-ahead and hour-ahead markets: Forward markets where electricity quantities and market 
clearing prices are calculated individually for each hour of the day on the basis of participant bids 
for energy sales and purchases. 
Demand-side management (DSM): The planning, implementation and monitoring of utility 
activities designed to encourage consumers to modify patterns of electricity usage, including the 
timing and level of electricity demand.
46 
Direct access: The ability of a retail customer to purchase electricity or other energy sources 
directly from a supplier other than their traditional supplier. 
Distributed generation: A distributed generation system involves small amounts of generation 
located on a utility's distribution system for the purpose of meeting local (substation level) peak 
loads and/or displacing the need to build additional (or upgrade) local distribution lines. 
Distribution: The delivery of energy to retail customers.  
Distribution system: The portion of the transmission and facilities (substations, transformers and 
lines) that convey electricity from high-power transmission lines to end-users. 
Distribution system operator (DSO): The body responsible for the distribution of electricity to 
retail customers. 
Divestiture: The stripping off of one utility function from the others by selling (spinning-off) or in 
some other way changing the ownership of the assets related to that function. Stripping off is most 
commonly associated with spinning-off generation assets so they are no longer owned by the 
shareholders that own the transmission and distribution assets. 
ECJ: European Court of Justice 
Electric generator: A facility that produces only electricity, commonly expressed in kilowatt hours 
(kWh) or megawatt hours (MWh). Electric generators include electric utilities and independent 
power producers. 
Electric power grid: A system of synchronised power providers and consumers connected by 
transmission and distribution lines and operated by one or more control centres. 
Electric power plant: A station containing prime movers, electric generators and auxiliary 
equipment for converting mechanical, chemical and/or fission energy into electric energy. 
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Electric system reliability: The degree to which the performance of the elements of the electrical 
system results in power being delivered to consumers within accepted standards and in the amount 
desired. Reliability encompasses two concepts, adequacy and security. Adequacy implies that there 
are sufficient generation and transmission resources installed and available to meet projected 
electrical demand plus reserves for contingencies. Security implies that the system will remain 
intact operationally (i.e. will have sufficient available operating capacity) even after outages or 
other equipment failure. The degree of reliability may be measured by the frequency, duration and 
magnitude of adverse effects on consumer service. 
Electric utility: A corporation, person, agency, authority or other legal entity or instrumentality 
aligned with distribution facilities for delivery of electric energy for use primarily by the public. 
These include investor-owned electric utilities, municipal and state utilities and rural electric 
cooperatives. 
Electric utility divestiture: The separation of one electric utility function from others through the 
selling of the management and ownership of the assets related to that function. It is most commonly 
associated with selling generation assets so they are no longer owned or controlled by the 
shareholders that own the company's transmission and distribution assets. 
Electrical system energy losses: The amount of energy lost during generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity, including plant and unaccounted for use. 
Electricity generation: The process of producing electric energy or the amount of electric energy 
produced by transforming other forms of energy, commonly expressed in kilowatt hours (kWh) or 
megawatt hours (MWh). 
Emissions: Anthropogenic releases of gases into the atmosphere. In the context of global climate 
change, they consist of radiatively important greenhouse gases (e.g. the release of carbon dioxide 
during fuel combustion). 
End user: A firm or individual that purchases products for its own consumption and not for resale 
(i.e. an ultimate consumer). 
Energy efficiency: Refers to programmes that are aimed at reducing the energy used by specific 
end-use devices and systems, typically without affecting the services provided.
47 
Energy security/fuel security: A policy that considers the risk of dependence on fuel sources 
located in remote and unstable regions of the world and the benefits of domestic and diverse fuel 
sources.  
Eurenergy:  Eurenergy is among the regulatory options (determining the shape, character and 
competences of future European energy regulation) presented in this report. This option for a 
European energy regulation body envisages an outright UK-style independent energy regulator. 
Eurenergy would be an EU agency supervised by the European Parliament and member states. 
European Union of Natural Gas Industry (Eurogas): This association represents the European 
natural gas industry vis-à-vis the European Union and all other relevant bodies at international 
level. For more information, see http://www.eurogas.org/. 
European Regulators Group (ERG):  The European Regulators Group for electronic 
communications networks and services has been set up by the European Commission to provide a 
                                                           
47 These programmes reduce overall electricity consumption (reported in megawatt hours), often without 
explicit consideration for the timing of programme-induced savings. Such savings are generally 
achieved by substituting technically more advanced equipment to produce the same level of end-use 
services (e.g. lighting, heating, motor drive) with less electricity. Examples include high-efficiency 
appliances, efficient lighting programmes, high-efficiency heating, ventilating and air conditioning 
(HVAC) systems or control modifications, efficient building design, advanced electric motor drives and 
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suitable mechanism for encouraging cooperation and coordination between national regulatory 
authorities and the Commission, in order to promote the development of the internal market for 
electronic communications networks and services, and to seek to achieve consistent application, in 
all member states, of the provisions set out in the directives of the new regulatory framework. For 
more information, see http://erg.eu.int/.  
European System of Energy Regulators (ESER): The European System of Energy Regulators 
could constitute another regulatory option for the future shape of European energy regulation. 
ESER would be the gradual integration of national regulators into an EU system which might 
eventually ‘harden’ to become a European regulator. 
European Energy Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas  (ERGEG): ERGEG acts as 
advisory group of the European Commission to help ensure a consistent application in all member 
states of the recently adopted new electricity and gas directives as well as the new regulation on 
cross-border exchanges of electricity. The group provides a transparent platform for cooperation 
between national regulatory authorities and between these authorities and the Commission. The 
group was set up by European Commission’s Decision of 11 November 2003 (see also CEER). 
European Transmission System Operators (ETSO): This body is concerned with the EU-wide 
harmonisation of network access and conditions for usage, especially for cross-border electricity 
trade. For more information, see http://www.etso-net.org/. 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP): The Action Plan details the work that has to be 
accomplished to reap the full benefits of the euro and to ensure the continued stability and 
competitiveness of EU financial markets. The action plan identifies a number (42) of legislative 
actions that need to be undertaken for the completion of the single market in financial services. For 
further information, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/actionplan/index.htm. 
Florence Forum: The Electricity Regulatory Forum of Florence, which now meets in Rome, was 
set up to discuss issues regarding the creation of a true internal electricity market that are not 
addressed in the electricity directive (2003/54/EC). The Forum consists of national regulatory 
authorities, member states, the European Commission, transmission system operators (TSOs), 
electricity traders, consumers, network users and power exchanges.  
Fuel cell: A device capable of generating an electrical current by converting the chemical energy of 
a fuel (e.g. hydrogen) directly into electrical energy. Fuel cells differ from conventional electrical 
cells in that the active materials such as fuel and oxygen are not contained within the cell but are 
supplied from outside. It does not contain an intermediate heat cycle, as do most other electrical 
generation techniques.  
Fuel cycle: The entire set of sequential processes or stages involved in the utilisation of fuel, 
including extraction, transformation, transportation and combustion. Emissions generally occur at 
each stage of the fuel cycle.  
Futures market: A trade centre for quoting prices on contracts for the delivery of a specified 
quantity of a commodity at a specified time and place in the future. 
Gas Transmission Europe (GTE): Gas Transmission Europe is the European organisation 
representing natural gas transmission companies and transmission arms of integrated gas 
companies. For more information, see http://www.gte2.be/.  
Generation: The process of producing electric energy by transforming other forms of energy; also, 
the amount of electric energy produced, expressed in KWHs. 
Generation company: An entity that owns or operates generating plants. The generation company 
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Generator capacity: The maximum output, commonly expressed in megawatts (MW), that 
generating equipment can supply to system load, adjusted for ambient conditions.  
Generator nameplate capacity (installed): The maximum rated output of a generator, prime 
mover or other electric power production equipment under specific conditions designated by the 
manufacturer. Installed generator nameplate capacity is commonly expressed in megawatts (MW) 
and is usually indicated on a nameplate physically attached to the generator. 
Gigawatt (GW): One billion watts or one thousand megawatts.  
Gigawatt-electric (GWe): One billion watts of electric capacity.  
Gigawatt hour (GWh): One billion watt hours 
Greenhouse effect: The result of water vapour, carbon dioxide and other atmospheric gases 
trapping radiant (infrared) energy, thereby keeping the earth's surface warmer than it would 
otherwise be. Greenhouse gases within the lower levels of the atmosphere trap this radiation, which 
would otherwise escape into space, and subsequent re-radiation of some of this energy back to the 
Earth maintains higher surface temperatures than would occur if the gases were absent. 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs): Those gases, such as water vapour, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, 
methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride, that are 
transparent to solar (short-wave) radiation but opaque to long-wave (infrared) radiation, thus 
preventing long-wave radiant energy from leaving earth’s atmosphere. The net effect is a trapping 
of absorbed radiation and a tendency to warm the planet's surface. 
Green pricing: In the case of renewable electricity, green pricing represents a market solution to 
the various problems associated with regulatory valuation of the non-market benefits of renewables. 
Green pricing programmes allow electricity customers to express their willingness to pay for 
renewable energy development through direct payments on their monthly utility bills.  
Grid: The layout of an electrical transmission and distribution system. A system of interconnected 
power lines and generators that is managed so that the generators are dispatched as needed to meet 
the requirements of the customers connected to the grid at various points.  
Hedging contracts: Contracts which establish future prices and quantities of electricity 
independent of the short-term market. Derivatives may be used for this purpose. 
Hydroelectric power: The use of flowing water to produce electrical energy.  
Hydrogen: A colourless, odourless, highly flammable gaseous element. It is the lightest of all 
gases and the most abundant element in the universe, occurring chiefly in combination with oxygen 
in water and also in acids, bases, alcohols, petroleum and other hydrocarbons. 
IEA: International Energy Agency. 
Incremental energy costs: The additional cost of producing and/or transmitting electric energy 
above some previously determined base cost.  
Independent power producer: A corporation, person, agency, authority or other legal entity or 
instrumentality that owns or operates facilities for the generation of electricity for use primarily by 
the public, and that is not an electric utility.  
Insider trading: Trading by insiders; or illegal trading by insiders who trade based on insider 
information. 
Interconnected system: A system consisting of two or more individual power systems normally 
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Interconnection: Two or more electric systems having a common transmission line that permits a 
flow of energy between them. The physical connection of the electric power transmission facilities 
allows for the sale or exchange of energy.  
Intermittent electric generator or intermittent resource: An electric generating plant with 
output controlled by the natural variability of the energy resource rather than dispatched based on 
system requirements. Intermittent output usually results from the direct, non-stored conversion of 
naturally occurring energy fluxes such as solar energy, wind energy or the energy of free-flowing 
rivers (that is, run-of-river hydroelectricity). 
Interruptible gas: Gas sold to customers with a provision that permits curtailment or cessation of 
service at the discretion of the distributing company under certain circumstances, as specified in the 
service contract.  
Interruptible load: This demand-side management category represents the consumer load that, in 
accordance with contractual arrangements, can be interrupted at the time of annual peak load by the 
action of the consumer at the direct request of the system operator. This type of control usually 
involves large-volume commercial and industrial consumers. Interruptible load does not include 
direct load control.  
Interruptible or curtailable rate: A special electricity or natural gas arrangement under which, in 
return for lower rates, the customer must either reduce energy demand on short notice or allow the 
electric or natural gas utility to temporarily cut off the energy supply for the utility to maintain 
service for higher priority users. This interruption or reduction in demand typically occurs during 
periods of high demand for the energy (summer for electricity and winter for natural gas).  
Interruptible power: Power and usually the associated energy made available by one utility to 
another. This transaction is subject to curtailment or cessation of delivery by the supplier in 
accordance with a prior agreement with the other party or under specified conditions.  
Kilowatt (kW): One thousand watts.  
Kilowatt-electric (kWe): One thousand watts of electric capacity.  
Kilowatt hour (kWh): A measure of electricity defined as a unit of work or energy, measured as 1 
kilowatt (1,000 watts) of power expended for 1 hour. One kWh is equivalent to 3,412 Btu.  
Lamfalussy Group  - Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities 
Markets: The Group is charged with the task of devising scenarios for improving the process of 
EU legislation in the field of securities markets so as to ensure its optimal implementation and 
continued relevance to market developments. The Lamfalussy group is responsible for improving 
the process of rule-making, supervision and enforcement of common securities provisions – the 
‘how’ question.  
Load (electric): The amount of electric power delivered or required at any specific point or points 
on a system. The requirement originates at the energy-consuming equipment of the consumers. 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG): LNG is natural gas that has been condensed to a liquid, typically by 
cryogenically cooling the gas to minus 161 degrees Celsius. This allows it to be transported by 
tankers. 
Load management: Steps taken to reduce power demand at peak load times or to shift some of it 
to off-peak times. This may be with reference to peak hours, peak days or peak seasons. The main 
factor affecting electric peaks is air-conditioning usage, which is therefore a prime target for load 
management efforts. Load management may be pursued by persuading consumers to modify 
behaviour or by using equipment that regulates some electric consumption. 
Losses (Electric utility): Electric energy or capacity that is wasted in the normal operation of a 
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substation conductors. Line losses are kilowatts or kilowatt hours lost in transmission and 
distribution lines under certain conditions. 
Madrid Forum: The European Gas Regulatory Forum of Madrid was set up to discuss issues 
regarding the creation of a true internal gas market, which are not addressed in the gas directive 
(2003/55/EC). The Forum consists of national regulatory authorities, member states, the European 
Commission, transmission system operators (TSOs), gas suppliers and traders, consumers, network 
users and gas exchanges. 
Market-based pricing: Prices of electric power or other forms of energy determined in an open 
market system of supply and demand under which prices are set solely by agreement as to what 
buyers will pay and sellers will accept. Such prices could recover less or more than full costs, 
depending upon what the buyers and sellers see as their relevant opportunities and risks. 
Megawatt (MW): One million watts of electricity.  
Megawatt electric (MWe): One million watts of electric capacity.  
Megawatt hour (MWh): One thousand kilowatt-hours or 1 million watt-hours.  
Merchant line: Merchant lines are privately financed interconnectors between EU member states, 
they can also be long-haul gas infrastructure importing gas into the EU. 
Natural monopoly: A situation where one firm can produce a given level of output at a lower total 
cost than can any combination of multiple firms. Natural monopolies occur in industries that exhibit 
decreasing average long-run costs due to size (economies of scale). According to economic theory, 
a public monopoly governed by regulation is justified when an industry exhibits natural monopoly 
characteristics. 
Network access: The possibility for all electricity suppliers to have unimpeded access to the supply 
network. See also third-party access (TPA). 
Network industries: Network industries include, among others, energy, telephony and transport 
services providers. Firms active in network industries are firms affected by network activity.  
Network regulation (incentive-based): It is network regulation that provides the regulated firm 
with the types of earnings incentives found in a competitive market and allows the firm, to some 
degree, to respond to those incentives. It represents an evolution in regulatory approach from more 
traditional forms of regulation such as rate-of-return or cost-based regulation.  Incentive-based 
regulatory mechanisms are: pricing flexibility for competitive services, earnings sharing, price 
freezes for non-competitive services and price caps. 
Nitrogen dioxide: A compound of nitrogen and oxygen formed by the oxidation of nitric oxide 
(NO) which is produced by the combustion of solid fuels.  
Nitrogen oxides (NOx): Compounds of nitrogen and oxygen produced by the burning of fossil 
fuels.  
Nuclear energy: Power obtained by splitting heavy atoms (fission) or joining light atoms (fusion). 
A nuclear energy plant uses a controlled atomic chain reaction to produce heat. The heat is used to 
make steam run conventional turbine generators. 
OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries): The acronym for the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries that have organised for the purpose of negotiating with oil 
companies on matters of oil production, prices and future concession rights. Current members (as 
of the date of this writing) are Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. See OPEC’s site at http://www.opec.org for more 
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Option: An option is a contractual agreement that gives the holder the right to buy (call option) or 
sell (put option) a fixed quantity of a security or commodity (for example, a commodity or 
commodity futures contract), at a fixed price, within a specified period of time. May either be 
standardised, exchange-traded and government regulated, or over-the-counter customised and non-
regulated. 
Outage (electric utility): An interruption of electric service that is temporary (minutes or hours) 
and affects a relatively small area (buildings or city blocks).  
OTC (over-the-counter): A security that is not traded on an exchange, usually due to an inability 
to meet listing requirements. 
Peak demand:  The electric load that corresponds to a maximum level of electric demand in a 
specified time period.  
Peak load: The highest electrical demand within a particular period of time. Daily electric peaks on 
weekdays occur in late afternoon and early evening. Annual peaks occur on hot summer days. 
Peak load plant: A plant usually housing old, low-efficiency steam units, gas turbines, diesels or 
pumped-storage hydroelectric equipment normally used during the peak-load periods. 
Peaking capacity: Capacity of generating equipment normally reserved for operation during the 
hours of highest daily, weekly or seasonal loads. Some generating equipment may be operated at 
certain times as peaking capacity and at other times to serve loads on an around-the-clock basis. 
Power marketers: Business entities engaged in buying and selling electricity. Power marketers do 
not usually own generating or transmission facilities. Power marketers, as opposed to brokers, take 
ownership of the electricity and are involved in interstate trade. These entities file with the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for status as a power marketer.  
Power exchange: An entity providing a competitive spot market for electric power through day- 
and/or hour-ahead auction of generation and demand bids. 
Power pool: An association of two or more interconnected electric systems having an agreement to 
coordinate operations and planning for improved reliability and efficiencies. 
Primary energy: All energy consumed by end users, excluding electricity but including the energy 
consumed at electric utilities to generate electricity. 
Public utility: Enterprise providing essential public services, such as electric, gas, telephone, water 
and sewer under legally established monopoly conditions. 
Raw fuel: Coal, natural gas, wood or other fuel that is used in the form in which it is found in 
nature, without chemical processing. 
Real-time market: The competitive generation market controlled and coordinated by the TSO for 
arranging real-time imbalance energy.  
Real-time pricing: The instantaneous pricing of electricity based on the cost of the electricity 
available for use at the time the electricity is demanded by the customer. 
Regulation: The governmental function of controlling or directing economic entities through the 
process of rule-making and adjudication. 
Reliability: Electric system reliability has two components: adequacy and security. Adequacy is 
the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy requirements 
of the customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and unscheduled outages of system 
facilities. Security is the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as 
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Renewable Energy Sources  (RES): Energy sources that are naturally replenishing but flow-
limited. They are virtually inexhaustible in duration but limited in the amount of energy that is 
available per unit of time. Renewable energy sources include: biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar, 
wind, ocean thermal, wave action and tidal action. 
Research and development (R&D): Research is the discovery of fundamental new knowledge. 
Development is the application of new knowledge to develop a potential new service or product 
Reserve generating capacity: Amount of generating capacity available to meet peak or 
abnormally high demands for power and to generate power during scheduled or unscheduled 
outages. 
Restructuring: The process of replacing a monopoly system of electric utilities with competing 
sellers, allowing individual retail customers to choose their electricity supplier but still receive 
delivery over the power lines of the local utility. It includes the reconfiguration of the vertically-
integrated electric utility. 
Retail market: A market in which electricity and other energy services are sold directly to the end-
use customer. 
Self-generation: A generation facility dedicated to serving a particular retail customer, usually 
located on the customer’s premises. The facility may either be owned directly by the retail 
customer or owned by a third party with a contractual arrangement to provide electricity to meet 
some or the customers’ entire load. 
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI): The term Services of General Economic Interest 
is used in Art. 86 of the Treaty and refers to market services that the member states subject to 
specific public service obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion. 
Settlement: The process of financial settlement for products and services purchased and sold. Each 
settlement involves a price and quantity. 
Spot market: A market in which a commodity is bought and sold for immediate or very near-term 
delivery, usually for a period of 30 days or less. The transaction does not imply a continuing 
arrangement between the buyer and the seller. A spot market is more likely to develop at a location 
with numerous interconnections, thus allowing for a large number of buyers and sellers.  
Spot price: The price for a one-time open market transaction for immediate delivery of a specific 
quantity of product at a specific location where the commodity is purchased ‘on the spot’ at current 
market rates. 
Stocks: Inventories of fuel stored for future use.  
Stranded costs: Costs incurred by a utility that may not be recoverable under market-based retail 
competition. Examples include undepreciated generating facilities, deferred costs and long-term 
contract costs. 
Sunk costs: Part of the capital costs actually incurred up to the date of reserves estimation minus 
depreciation and amortisation expenses. Items such as exploration costs, land acquisition costs and 
costs of financing can be included. 
Supply-side: Activities conducted on the utility's side of the customer meter. Activities designed to 
supply electric power to customers, rather than meeting load though energy efficiency measures or 
on-site generation on the customer side of the meter. 
System (electric): Physically-connected generation, transmission and distribution facilities 
operated as an integrated unit under one central management or operating supervision. 
Tariff: A published volume of rate schedules and general terms and conditions under which a 
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Third-party access (TPA): TPA is related to the  unhindered and uncomplicated access to 
electricity and gas markets by suppliers and new market entrants at the national, regional and local 
level.  
Transmission (electric): The movement or transfer of electric energy over an interconnected group 
of lines and associated equipment between points of supply and points at which it is transformed 
for delivery to consumers or is delivered to other electric systems. Transmission is considered to 
end when the energy is transformed for distribution to the consumer. In brief, transmission stands 
for transporting bulk power over long distances. 
Transmission circuit: A conductor used to transport electricity from generating stations to load.  
Transmission line: A set of conductors, insulators, supporting structures and associated equipment 
used to move large quantities of power at high voltage, usually over long distances between a 
generating or receiving point and major substations or delivery points.  
Transmission network: A system of transmission or distribution lines cross-connected and 
operated in such a manner as to permit multiple power supply to any principal point.  
Transmission system (electric): An interconnected group of electric transmission lines and 
associated equipment for moving or transferring electric energy in bulk between points of supply 
and points at which it is transformed for delivery over the distribution system lines to consumers or 
is delivered to other electric systems.  
Transmission System Operator (TSO): The body responsible for the transmission of bulk 
electricity from the points of generation to where the electricity is transformed in order to be 
delivered to consumers. 
Transport: Movement of natural, synthetic and/or supplemental gas between points beyond the 
immediate vicinity of the field or plant from which produced except 1) for movements through well 
or field lines to a central point for delivery to a pipeline or processing plant within the same state, 
or 2) movements from a city gate point of receipt to consumers through distribution mains. 
Trunk line: A main pipeline.  
Turbine: A machine for generating rotary mechanical power from the energy of a stream of fluid 
(such as water, steam or hot gas). Turbines convert the kinetic energy of fluids to mechanical 
energy through the principles of impulse and reaction, or a mixture of the two. 
Unbundling: Disaggregating electric utility service into its basic components and offering each 
component separately for sale with separate rates for each component. For example, generation, 
transmission and distribution could be unbundled and offered as discrete services. Unbundling has 
recently acquired a political connotation of separating vertically integrated monopoly functions of 
public or privately-owned utilities into their component parts for the purpose of separate service 
offerings. 
Union of the Electricity Industry (EURELECTRIC): It is the sector association representing the 
common interests of the European electricity industry and its worldwide affiliates and associates. 
For more information, see http://public.eurelectric.org/.  
Universal service – Universal Service Obligations (USOs): Electric service sufficient for basic 
needs (an evolving bundle of basic services) available to virtually all members of the population 
regardless of income. 
Vertical integration: The combination within a firm or business enterprise of one or more stages 
of production or distribution. In the electric industry, it refers to the historical arrangement whereby 
a utility owns its own generating plants, transmission system and distribution lines to provide all 
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Volt: A unit of electromotive force. It is the amount of force required to drive a steady current of 
one ampere through a resistance of one ohm. 
Voltage: The difference in electrical potential between any two conductors or between a conductor 
and ground. It is a measure of the electric energy per electron that electrons can acquire and/or give 
up as they move between the two conductors.  
Watt (W): The unit of electrical power equal to one ampere under a pressure of one volt. A watt is 
equal to 1/746 horsepower.  
Watt-hour (Wh): The electrical energy unit of measure equal to one watt of power supplied to, or 
taken from, an electric circuit steadily for one hour.  
Wholesale competition: A system whereby a distributor of power would have the option to buy its 
power from a variety of producers, and the producers would be able to compete to sell their power 
to a variety of distribution companies. 
Wholesale power market: The purchase and sale of electricity from generators to resellers (who 
sell to retail customers) along with the ancillary services needed to maintain reliability and power 
quality at the transmission level. 
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